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Inequality and Growth 
1. Introduction 
1.1 KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES, CIRCA 1960: NOT SO 
SIMILAR AFTER ALL 
To introduce the theme of this paper I shall revisit the puzzle raised by 
Lucas (1993) at the beginning of his article. In the early 1960s, South 
Korea and the Philippines were similar with respect to all major eco- 
nomic aggregates: GDP per capita, population, urbanization, primary 
and secondary school enrollment. The Philippines had a somewhat 
higher share of GDP in manufacturing, but in exports both countries had 
the same proportions of primary commodities and manufactures. Given 
nearly identical starting points, how can it be that over the next quarter 
century Korea experienced "miraculous" growth averaging about 6% per 
annum, while the Philippines stagnated at about 2%? 
If one looks beyond first moments, however, initial conditions were in 
fact quite different. As shown by Table 1, the distribution of income was 
considerably more unequal in the Philippines, whose Lorentz curve lay 
everywhere below that of Korea.1 The Gini coefficient was 17 percentage 
points higher, about 1.8 standard deviations in the world distribution of 
I am indebted to Jess Benhabib, Jordi Gali, and Julio Rotemberg for helpful conversations at 
early stages in this project. I am also grateful for their detailed comments to my dis- 
cussants, Roberto Perotti and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, as well as to Alberto Alesina, Abhijit 
Banerjee, Andrew Bernard, Giuseppe Bertola, Patrick Bolton, Raquel Ferandez, Herschel 
Grossman, Andrew Newman, Torsten Persson, and Thomas Piketty. I also wish to thank 
Klaus Deininger and Lynn Squire for providing me with their data set, and Tim Smeeding 
for providing me with specific series from the Luxembourg Income Study. Financial sup- 
port from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9601319) and the C.V. Starr Center is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1. The data are from Deininger and Squire (1995a); Qi denotes the share of the ith quintile. 
The year 1965 is the earliest one for which figures for both countries are available. 
Moreover these figures were based on the same survey method (gross household in- 
come), making them comparable. The 1988 Philippine number is for gross personal 
income, but very close to the 1985 figure, which still used household income. 
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Table 1 KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES 
Country Gini(%) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q4 Q +Q4 Q5/Q1 Q5/(Q1+Q2) 
1965 
Korea 34.34 5.80 13.54 15.53 23.32 41.81 38.85 7.21 2.16 
Philippines 51.32 3.50 12.50 8.00 20.00 56.00 20.50 16.00 3.50 
1988 
Korea 33.64 7.39 12.29 16.27 21.81 42.24 38.08 5.72 2.15 
Philippines 45.73 5.20 9.10 13.30 19.90 52.50 33.20 10.10 3.67 
Ginis, or 2.5 among East Asian countries. Most strikingly, the ratio of 
the income share of the top 20% to the bottom 20%, or even to the 
bottom 40%, was about twice as large in the Philippines. Similar dispari- 
ties characterized land ownership: the Gini coefficient for farmland was 
38.7 for Korea and 53.4 for the Philippines in 1961 and 1960 respec- 
tively.2 This greater concentration of income and wealth, which persists 
to this day, cannot be blamed on the "kleptocratic" nature of the Marcos 
regime. Ferdinand Marcos was first elected president in 1965, and de- 
clared a state of emergency only in 1972. Preceding him in power at the 
end of the U.S.-assisted reconstruction period were two presidents 
whose main policies are described in the U.S. State Department's back- 
ground notes as seeking to "expand Philippine ties to its Asian neigh- 
bors, implement domestic reform programs, and develop and diversify 
the economy." 
Of course Table 1 does not constitute proof that greater initial equality 
was the reason-certainly not the sole reason-why the "miracle" oc- 
curred in one country and not the other. But the facts which it docu- 
ments do suggest that the answer to the puzzle may lie outside the 
representative-agent framework. 
2. The source for land Ginis is Taylor and Hudson (1972). The twelve-point gap corre- 
sponds to about one standard deviation. While it is common knowledge that Korea 
implemented a land reform following World War II, it may be worth mentioning that the 
Philippines also had its own around the end of World War I, during the American 
occupation period. Following the disestablishment of the Catholic Church, a large part 
of its land holdings were purchased and redistributed. The relatively high land Gini for 
1960 suggests that either land reform was not as egalitarian as in Korea, where individ- 
ual holdings were limited to 3 hectares, or that land ownership became reconcentrated 
during the following forty years. 
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1.2 EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 
South Korea and the other East Asian "dragons" are usually contrasted 
not to the nearby Philippines, but to Latin American countries. It has 
long been part of development economists' conventional wisdom that 
the very equal distribution of income and land in the first group played a 
significant role in their takeoff, whereas the high levels of wealth concen- 
tration in the latter were a serious impediment to growth. In recent years 
the literature has moved from anecdotal to formal empirical evidence, 
spurred by the findings of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) of a negative effect of inequality in cross-country growth 
regressions, and by Perotti's (1992, 1994, 1996) methodical testing of the 
main theories. 
Table 2 summarizes the main results from 23 recent studies of the links 
from inequality to growth or investment. I shall refer to it throughout 
the paper. Column (1) corresponds to the basic, reduced-form regres- 
sion, where the average growth rate of per capita GDP over some long 
period (twenty years or so) is regressed on initial inequality and several 
controls. These typically include: (a) initial income, whose coefficient is 
always negative and significant; (b) the initial stock of human capital, or 
proxies in the form of initial school enrollment ratios [as shown by 
column (8), this effect is systematically positive3]; (c) regional dummies. 
These regressions, run over a variety of data sets and periods with many 
different measures of income distribution, deliver a consistent message: 
initial inequality is detrimental to long-run growth. The magnitude of 
this effect is consistent across most studies: a one-standard-deviation 
decrease in inequality raises the annual growth rate of GDP per capita by 
0.5 to 0.8 percentage points. Whether this is large or small may be in the 
eye of the beholder. On one hand, it amounts to between 30% and 45% 
of the standard deviation of growth rates found in most samples. It also 
implies an income gap of about 25% after 30 years, which is far from 
inconsequential. On the other hand, this does not come close to account- 
ing for the growth differential observed between Korea and the Philip- 
pines, or East Asia and Latin America. However, several models in the 
literature predict a nonlinear effect, possibly leading to a multiplicity of 
equilibria. In that case small differences in initial inequality can have 
marginal effects well in excess of the average slope estimated by linear 
regressions, and significantly influence long-run outcomes. 
3. With the exception of the puzzling result that when male and female stock are distin- 
guished, the latter appears to contribute negatively (e.g., Barro, 1996, who also dis- 
cusses possible explanations). 
Table 2 EFFECTS OF INEQUALITY ON GROWTH OR INVESTMENT AND SOME OF THEIR DETERMINANTS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
INEQ DEM DEM x INEQ REDIST HUMCAP CRED CRED x INEQ INSTAB 
INEQ INEQ 
on on on on on on on on on on 
GR, INV GR, INV GR, INV REDIST GR, INV GR, INV GR, INV GR, INV INSTAB GR, INV 
TRAN, EDEXP TRAN, EDEXP 
No. Reference TAX TAX 
1 Alesina-Rodrik (94) 0 0 0 
2 Alesina-Perotti (96) E 0 - 
3 Alesina et al. (96) 0 E E 
4 Barro (96) + M=( F=0 E 
5 Benhabib-Spiegel (96) (-) E (- 
6 Bourguignon (94) 0 E 
7 Brandolini-Rossi (95) 0 
8 Clarke (92) E 0 
9 Deininger-Squire (95) - (+) + + 
10 Devarajan et al. (93) + (-) 
11 Easterlv-Rebello (93) + (+) 
Keefer-Knack (95) 
Levine-Renelt (92) 
Lindert (96) 
McCallum-Biais (87) 
(-) (-) (-) 
e () (?) 
? 
ED 0 
0 ED 
12 
13 
14 
15 
\/ 
16 Perotti (92) e (-) (+) + + e 
17 Perotti (94) e (-) (+) 0 - 
18 Perotti (96) 0 0 (-) ) (+) ) M= F==e 3 O 
19 Persson-Tabellini (92) 0 D 
20 Persson-Tabellini (94) 0 - e (+) (-) 
21 Sala-i-Martin (92) ED 
22 Svensson (93) + 3 
23 Venieris-Gupta (86) e0 
Symbols: (, E: consistent sign and generally significant; +, -: consistent sign, sometimes significant; (+), (-): consistent sign but generally not significant; (-): inconsistent 
sign with significant coefficients; 0: inconsistent sign or close to zero, and not significant; t~^: inverse U-shaped, significant. 
INEQ: Measures of inequality: 1 uses income and land Ginis; 5, 16, and 23 use -Q3; 6 uses -Q1, -(Q1 +Q2), and Q5; 7, 9 use income and land Ginis; 8 and 11 use income Gini, 
Theil, coefficient of variation, and Qs/(Ql+Q2); 12 uses Gini, land Gini, and -Q3; 14 uses ln(Q5/Q3) + ln(Q3/Ql); 17 uses -Q3 and -(Q1+Q2); 18 uses -(Q3+Q4); 19 uses -Q3 
and land Gini; 20 uses Q5 and -Q3; 22 uses -(Q1+Q2)/Q5. 
DEM: Measures of political rights and degree of democracy; see each study. 
REDIST: Measures of redistribution: EDEXP is the share of education expenditures in GDP; TRAN and TAX are various transfers and tax rates, as detailed below. 10 uses 
current government expenditure/GDP (D), health and education (?); 11 uses twelve different average and marginal tax rates; only one has a significant effect; 12 uses shares in GDP of social security, welfare, government transfers, tax revenues, government expenditures, and government consumption, as well as the share of employment in the 
state sector; 14 uses the shares in GDP of payments for social security, welfare, unemployment, health (as well as the sum of these four transfers), and education; 16, 17, and 
20 use total transfers/GDP; 18 uses GDP shares of: social security, health plus housing, and education; also the labor tax rate and average and marginal income tax rates; 15 
and 21 use GDP share of social security. 
CRED: Credit-market imperfections, measured in 16 by (minus) the loan-to-value ratio for mortgages. 
HUMCAP: 4, 5, 9, and 15 use the initial stock of human capital (primary and/or secondary education); M=males, F=females; all others proxy for the stock with enrollment 
ratios. 
INSTAB: 1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 16, and 18 focus on sociopolitical instability, measured by various combinations of protests, strikes, government turnover, political violence, coups, 
revolutions, etc. 4, 12, and 22 focus on the security of property rights, measured by indicators of country risk (default, expropriation, nationalization), contract enforceability, 
corruption, etc. 
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The inclusion of controls (b) and especially (c) typically reduces the 
coefficient on inequality. Sometimes it becomes insignificant, as in 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) when the stock of human capital is in- 
cluded, or in Deininger and Squire (1995b) where dummies for Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa drive out income Ginis-but not land 
Ginis. In most other studies inequality remains significant even in the 
presence of these controls. In any case, enrollments in and stocks of 
secondary education have a substantial negative correlation with inequal- 
ity, and in some of the theories discussed below the link between income 
distribution and growth arises precisely through human-capital invest- 
ment. Note finally that a large part of the cross-country variation in 
inequality comes from the high levels observed in Africa and, particu- 
larly, Latin America. These persistent interregional differences need to 
be explained, and in fact point in the direction of the models with multi- 
ple long-run distributions mentioned above. 
1.3 OVERVIEW 
This paper presents and extends the main theories linking income 
distribution and growth, as well as the evidence on their relevance. 
This is done through two unifying models, a survey of the empirical 
literature, and an econometric exercise. The first model integrates the 
political-economy and imperfect-capital-markets theories. The second 
one deals with social conflict and the security of property rights. The 
empirical section asks whether countries are converging to the same 
level of inequality. The paper focuses primarily on mechanisms by 
which income distribution (whether exogenous or endogenous) can 
affect output growth, rather than on reverse effects from the level of 
development to inequality. It thus barely touches on the Kuznets (1955) 
hypothesis.4 
I start in Section 2 with theories where asset markets are complete and 
distributional effects arise solely through the balance of power in the 
political system (Bertola, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini 1994). The idea is that by lowering the income of the median 
voter or pivotal middle class relative to the national average, greater 
inequality increases the pressure for redistribution. This, in turn, dis- 
courages investment. The model developed here, which combines fea- 
tures of Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Benabou (1995), displays this 
mechanism but also formalizes departures from the "one person, one 
vote" ideal. Whether or not there is a role for productive public invest- 
4. See Fields and Jakubson (1994) for a recent review as well as some new evidence, which 
does not support the Kuznets curve hypothesis. 
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ment, growth in this class of models always increases with the degree of 
pro-wealth bias in the political system. I also provide new results, to- 
gether with a general caveat, on the issue of whether inequality affects 
democracies and nondemocracies differentially. Compared to a perfect 
democracy, income disparities are shown to have a lesser impact on 
redistribution and growth only in right-wing or wealth-biased regimes, 
and a greater impact in left-wing or populist ones. 
In Section 3 I turn to another set of theories, where the distribution of 
wealth has macroeconomic implications due to imperfections in asset 
markets. I use the very same model as before but simply "turn off" the 
loan market. Indeed, the main idea in this literature, which starts with 
Loury (1981), is that credit constraints prevent the poor from undertak- 
ing the efficient amount of investment. With decreasing returns their 
marginal product is higher, so that redistributions can increase total 
output or growth. My model embodies the trade-off between these 
growth benefits of land reform, public schooling, or other progressive 
transfers, and their traditional costs due to depressed incentives for 
savings or labor supply. The other central issue in the literature is in- 
tergenerational mobility, for which uninsurable shocks are of the es- 
sence. Some papers focus on the decentralized equilibrium (Galor and 
Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Benabou, 1996a; Aghion and 
Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997), while others combine market incomplete- 
ness with the politics of redistribution (Perotti, 1993; Saint-Paul and 
Verdier, 1993; Verdier and Ades, 1993; Saint-Paul, 1994; Benabou, 1995). 
In a related class of models the macroeconomic effects of distribution 
arise from, or are magnified by, the endogenous sorting of agents into 
homogeneous communities or other "clubs" (Benabou, 1993, 1996b; 
Durlauf, 1996a, 1996b; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996, 1994; Kremer and 
Maskin, 1994). The results obtained in this paper are representative of 
this entire literature, and include a number of new propositions as well. 
I explain for instance why maximizing growth requires some (interior) 
degree of democracy, in contrast to the complete-markets case. I also 
demonstrate how the combination of credit constraints and a less than 
perfectly democratic political system can lead to multiple long-run equi- 
libria, differing both in growth rates and in levels of inequality. I then use 
this example to explain the common principle by which multiple steady- 
state distributions arise, through a variety of general equilibrium feed- 
backs, in several of the models mentioned above. 
Section 4 turns to theories based on the idea that sociopolitical conflict 
reduces the security of property rights, thereby discouraging accumula- 
tion. In particular, when the gap between rich and poor widens, the 
latter may have a greater temptation to engage in rent-seeking or preda- 
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tory activities at the expense of the former. The security of property 
rights is the main focus of Grossman (1991, 1994), Acemoglu (1995), 
Tornell and Velasco (1992), Tomell (1993), Grossman and Kim (1996), and 
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996). Only the last two papers, however, 
explicitly link inequality and growth. I propose here a simple growth 
version of the prisoner's dilemma which captures the essence of this 
class of models. The economy's maximum sustainable growth rate is 
shown to be negatively related to interest groups' rent-seeking abilities, 
as well as to income disparities between them. It may then be in the 
interest of the rich to collectively transfer wealth to the poor through 
land reform, education subsidies, a minimum wage, or trade protection. 
More generally, the analysis reveals that what really matters is not in- 
come inequality per se but inequality in the relative distribution of earn- 
ing and political power. I also point out that actual instability or uncer- 
tainty is not part of the story told by most of these models, contrary to 
common interpretation. As in the case of taxation, growth is reduced 
through a decline in the expected return on investment, due to a higher 
threat of expropriation. 
Finally, the possibility of multiple long-run distributions and history 
dependence discussed earlier leads me to raise in Section 5 a new 
empirical question: are countries converging to the same level of in- 
equality, or are there permanent differences? Equivalently, is there con- 
vergence not only in the first moment of their income distributions- 
GDP per capita-but also in the second one (and higher), as would be 
predicted by most versions of the neoclassical model once it is enriched 
with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks? Using a new data set put to- 
gether by Deininger and Squire (1995a), I make a first pass at this issue 
of convergence in distribution. Although it is insufficient to resolve the 
issue, this exercise uncovers some interesting puzzles, including some 
evidence of mean reversion in Ginis.5 
The general strategy adopted in this paper is one of simplification and 
unification. The models are thus stripped of many elements which con- 
tribute to the richness and realism of the literature, but are not essential 
to conveying the main ideas. These are briefly discussed in the conclud- 
ing section, before turning to directions for further research. All proofs 
are gathered in the Appendix. 
5. The paucity and sometimes poor quality of international data on income distribution 
remain binding constraints here, as in all empirical work on these issues; see Deininger 
and Squire (1995a), Perotti (1996) and OECD (1996) for discussions of data quality. 
Another general problem is the lack of almost any data on the distribution of wealth 
(land is sometimes used as an imperfect proxy), even though in most theories it is this 
distribution rather than that of income which is determinant. 
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2. Political Economy with Complete Markets 
The model to be developed here and in the next section will bring to- 
gether the political-economy and imperfect-capital-markets theories. 
There is a continuum of nonaltruistic overlapping-generation families, 
indexed by i E [0, 1]. The utility of a member i in generation t is 
u = Inc; + plndt, (1) 
where ct and dt denote consumption when young and old respectively. 
This person is born endowed with resources w', distributed indepen- 
dently across agents with mean wt E[wt]. Agents can invest in human 
or physical capital according to the technology 
't = r(kt)t(wt)1-, (2) 
where r is constant and 0 </3 p 1; k\ is the amount invested and y' is the 
second-period pretax income. Note that individuals face decreasing re- 
turns but the aggregate technology is linear. One can interpret wt as 
agent i's basic level of skill or human capital, which can be supple- 
mented through investment. The higher the general level of basic skills 
wt, the easier it is to develop or acquire new knowledge. I shall focus for 
a while on what happens within a given generation, in which case time 
subscripts can be omitted. 
2.1 SAVINGS AND INTRAGENERATIONAL GROWTH 
There is a frictionless credit market where agents in each generation 
borrow from and lend to each other, at some endogenous interest rate r. 
The amount borrowed by i is denoted bi 0. Finally, there is a govern- 
ment which redistributes second-period income. I depart here from the 
standard case of linear taxes and focus instead on a simple log-linear 
scheme which will yield explicit solutions with both perfect and missing 
capital markets.6 Let income after taxes and transfers be 
yi=(yi)l-T)T ()3) 
where the break even income level y is defined by the balanced-budget 
constraint 
6. This scheme was introduced in Benabou (1995) in a context of dynastically altruistic 
families facing missing credit and insurance markets. Applied here to complete markets, 
it yields the same results as would be obtained from the standard scheme of linear taxes 
and lump-sum transfers. 
20 BENABOU 
(yi)1-T )i di= yi y. (4) 
Note that the scheme is progressive (e.g., y > y) when 0 < r - 1, and 
regressive when r < 0; the maximum rate compatible with free disposal 
is r = 1. I allow r < 0, which will be relevant when studying imper- 
fectly democratic regimes, but for technical reasons I restrict it to r ? 
-V1l+l/p1/3= . Given an expected redistribution rate r, agent i's maxi- 
mization problem is 
max(ln(w' + b - k1) + pln{[r(ki) wl -] -(j) - fbi}), (5) 
/~,k/ 
and the first-order conditions are dici = pf = p,3(1 - r)(9i/ki). Together 
with (2) and (3), the second one implies that everyone invests the same 
amount, ki = k; hence yi = yi = rkw' -~ = y = y and r = r3j(1 - r)(w/k)1 -. 
The first Euler equation then becomes 
rkPw1-P - rb = prf3(1 - r)(w/k)'l-(w' + b' - k). 
Summing over agents and using the loan-market-clearing condition 01 b di 
= 0 yields 
pp(l - T)w k = =- s(T)w. (6) 1 + pp(l - T) 
Each individual thus invests the same fraction s = s(T) of aggregate re- 
sources. Consequently everyone has the same second-period income, so 
no actual transfers take place in equilibrium. The critical feature of redis- 
tribution under complete markets is the threat of expropriation of part of 
the return to investment, as opposed to actual transfers of wealth.7 In 
particular, the growth rate of aggregate income within each generation, 
g() - ln(y/w) = lnr + f3ns(T), (7) 
declines as the tax rate r rises. 
7. One could easily introduce some multiplicative form of ability into the investment 
function (2), perhaps correlated with w'. Optimal investment levels would then differ 
across individuals and equilibrium transfers would be positive, but none of the essential 
results would change. 
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2.2 INTERGENERATIONAL LINKAGES 
To extend this result to long-run growth rates it remains to specify the 
dynamic linkages between generations. The simplest kind is an aggre- 
gate spillover (as in Persson and Tabellini, 1994) through which the 
productivity achieved by generation t becomes embodied into the basic 
human capital endowment of generation t + 1: 
t+l = t+lYt' (8) 
where E' is an i.i.d. shock with mean normalized to 1, representing for 
instance innate ability. Equivalently, let altruistic parents devote some of 
their second-period resources to children's education (say, primary 
schooling), which is provided as a public good. Specifically, let parents 
care about old-age consumption, now denoted c'", and about the human- 
capital endowment of their child: 
Ut = lnc' + pylnc'" + p(l - y)Et[lnw+l]. (1') 
The latter is a combination of ability and public expenditures on school- 
ing, 
W+l = KE+let, (8') 
with the latter financed through a proportional tax on second-period 
income. With logarithmic preferences the unanimously preferred tax 
rate is 1 - y, so that c' i = yd, and et = (1 - y)dt = (1 - Y)Yt- Nothing else in 
parents' behavior or maximized utility is affected.8 Thus wt.+ = K(1 - 
Y)Et+lYt, and normalizing the constant to one yields the same result as (8), 
namely that the intra- and intergenerational growth rates are equal: 
gt = ln(yt/yt-_) = ln(wt+l/wt) = ln(yt/wt) = lnr + 81lns('t), (9) 
where Tt is the tax rate chosen in generation t. Moreover, the distribution 
of relative incomes w/lw, = Et is stationary, which will result in a time- 
invariant equilibrium tax rate. In what follows I shall therefore omit time 
subscripts once again. 
8. See Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Benabou (1996a) for models of private, local, and 
public education with a similar specification. The former uses overlapping generations 
with a "warm-glow" bequest, as I do here; the latter has dynastic preferences. 
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2.3 INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION 
I now examine the determination of taxes within each generation. Agent 
i's optimal investment entails a net borrowing of 
b'= (w- W) (10) 
1+p 
at the interest rate 
f = rf3(l - T)([1 + pf,(l - T)]1-. 
Redistribution through what is essentially a tax on capital income lowers 
this equilibrium return, thereby favoring borrowers and hurting lenders. 
It leaves unaffected the "representative" agent with resources equal to 
the per capita average w, as he does not make use of the loan market. 
Given optimal borrowing and investment decisions, the intertemporal 
utility of individual i is equal to 
[ w- 1=) 1 + p (11) 
where 
V(T) (1 + p)lnw + ln[l - s(T)] + pln[rs(Tr)] = Inc + plnd, (12) 
with c and d representing aggregate consumption in the first and second 
periods. For an agent with the average endowment w the second term in 
(11) vanishes. His preferences thus coincide with those of a social plan- 
ner concerned only with intertemporal efficiency, in the sense of being 
indifferent to the distribution of consumption across individuals. Since 
p6r 
V'(r) = - p (13) (1 - r)[1 + p/3(l - T)] 
the preferred tax rate of this representative individual or social planner is 
zero.9 Individuals poorer than average would like (progressive) taxes on 
9. Note that V(r) is different from the ex ante efficiency E[UA(rT)]. Because agents are risk- 
averse, maximizing this "behind-the-veil" criterion would always call for T > 0. By 
assuming that people vote only once they know their type, I am intentionally abstracting 
from the insurance value of redistribution, in order to highlight its effects on the path of 
output. See Loury (1981) or Benabou (1996a, 1995) for dynamic models which incorpo- 
rate this insurance value. 
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capital: it is easily seen that for all wi < w, Ui(T) is single-peaked and 
reaches its maximum at the solution ' to U'Li() = 0, or 
T(1 + p) wi 
?b(r) = =1 - --. (14) [l + p(l - )][1 + pW3(1 - )] w 
This implies that agent i's preferred tax rate i is positive and declines as 
his relative income falls, as in Meltzer and Richards (1981). The problem 
is more complicated for agents who are richer than average, as 4 is not 
monotonic over all negative values of r. One can nonetheless show that 
U'(r) remains strictly concave on its domain [r, 1], where T < -1 was 
defined earlier. Thus for wqlw < 1 - +(z) agent i's preferred tax rate is still 
given by the first-order condition (14); for still richer individuals it is the 
comer solution, r = T. 
To abstract from time consistency issues, I follow Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) in assuming that r is chosen irrevocably during the first sub- 
period. If the political process can be represented by majority voting 
over the single issue of taxation, the median voter is decisive, and his 
preferred policy is implemented. Hence the central implication of this 
class of models:10 
PROPOSITION 1 Let inequality be measured by, or correlated with, a lower ratio 
of median to mean pretax wealth. Then more inequality leads to more redistribu- 
tion, slower growth, and reduced efficiency: r rises, causing g and V to fall. 
These results on the personal distribution of wealth in a one-factor 
model can be extended to the functional distribution of income, say 
between capital and labor. Bertola (1993) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 
show more generally that a lower median-to-mean ratio in agents' rela- 
tive endowments of accumulated and nonaccumulated factors reduces 
the growth rate. The mechanism is the same, namely increased taxation 
of capital, and so are the efficiency implications. The fact that these are 
models with infinite-lived agents also makes clear that the results are 
independent of the assumption of myopic preferences."l Note finally 
10. The main difference between the present model and that of Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), apart from the fact that I allow 3 < 1 and make explicit the functioning of the 
loan market (b's and r), is the use of a geometric rather than linear redistribution 
scheme. While this modification will prove most convenient when incomplete credit 
markets are introduced, it is here inessential. All formulas derived above also obtain in 
the traditional, linear, case. 
11. The quantitative magnitude of the effect, on the other hand, does depend on how far 
into the future agents look when making savings decisions and casting their ballots; see 
Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rill (1996). 
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that what is key in Proposition 1 is how inequality affects the desire for 
redistribution of whoever is the decisive agent in the political system. 
Because the latter is likely to depart from the "one person, one vote" 
abstraction, I will later on consider variations in political institutions. 
2.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
I now turn to the evidence on the general idea that inequality increases 
redistribution, which in turn reduces growth. Column (4) of Table 2 re- 
ports the results of empirical studies which have examined the links be- 
tween income inequality and a variety of measures of redistribution: share 
of transfers in GDP (either as a whole or decomposed into different catego- 
ries such as welfare, unemployment, health, and social security), average 
and marginal tax rates, or education expenditures. Column (5) then re- 
ports the effects which these policies were found to have on the econ- 
omy's growth or investment rate. Some studies examine only one of these 
two relationships; others, most notably Perotti (1992, 1996), estimate a 
simultaneous system. 
In column (4) the measure of inequality is generally taken to be the 
share of the third quintile, or the share of the third plus fourth quintiles. 
This reflects the emphasis placed by the models on the median voter and 
middle class. The results are rather disappointing: the effect of income 
distribution on transfers and taxes is rarely significant, and its sign varies 
from one study or even one specification to another. The same is true for 
education expenditures. Both Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) raise an objection to interpreting such regressions as a test 
of the theory. They point out that redistribution can take many forms 
other than straight transfers: progressive income taxation, minimum- 
wage laws, trade and capital restrictions, the composition of government 
expenditure, patent legislation, regulation, and the protection of property 
rights. This is certainly true, but not entirely persuasive. First, the studies 
reported in Table 2 already include some of these variables such as tax 
rates, public employment, or education expenditures. Second, it is hard 
to see why the increased pressure for redistribution would manifest itself 
only through indirect channels and not through direct ones. Presumably 
the pivotal voter or class is equalizing the marginal costs and benefits of 
pressure along the different dimensions of redistribution. Finally, one 
would want to see at least some evidence that minimum-wage laws, trade 
and capital restrictions, and regulation are higher in more unequal coun- 
tries. Such is not the case within the OECD: these indirect forms of redistri- 
bution are lowest in the United States, which has the greatest pretax 
inequality, and much more extensive in continental Europe (welfare state 
and labor legislation) or Japan (regulation and trade protection). 
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Column (5) provides even more surprising news. The coefficient in 
growth regressions of most of the transfers described above is positive, 
and frequently statistically significant. This is true not only for education 
expenditures, but also for social insurance and even pensions. These 
results stand in sharp contrast to those found for pure government 
consumption. Most of the studies which include this variable find it to be 
negatively related to growth, as in Barro (1990). Government consump- 
tion, however, is conceptually different from redistribution, at least on 
the expenditure side; I shall come back to this point later on. On the 
revenue side both are eventually financed through taxes, but even tax 
rates fail to have the predicted growth effect. Easterly and Rebello (1993) 
use twelve different average and marginal tax rates; the coefficients are 
always negative, but only one is significantly different from zero. Perotti 
(1996) finds that both average and marginal tax rates have a significantly 
positive effect on growth. One might be tempted to dismiss the whole 
set of results in column (5) as due to reverse causality, based on the 
plausible idea that the welfare state is a luxury good-a form of "Wag- 
ner's law." The fact that Perotti estimates simultaneous-equation sys- 
tems which allow for the level and growth rate of GDP to affect transfers 
and tax rates precludes such as an easy way out. Together, the results of 
columns (4) and (5) indicate that the median-voter, complete-markets 
model is missing some important factors which bear on both the causes 
and consequences of redistribution. 
2.5 DEMOCRACIES AND OTHER REGIMES 
Another dimension of the political-economy model which has generated 
substantial empirical effort concerns its differential implications across 
political regimes. Perhaps because some of these have not been formally 
modeled but simply argued on the basis of intuition, the literature mani- 
fests some disagreement as to what exactly these implications are and 
how they can be tested. I shall therefore explicitly formalize departures 
from the "one person, one vote" ideal, in a manner which is quite 
specific but allows me to demonstrate some more general points. 
Instead of the voter at the 50th percentile of the wealth distribution 
being decisive, let it be the agent or pressure group located at the pth 
percentile. The case p > 2 corresponds to a system biased against the 
poor due to a wealth-restricted voting franchise, unequal lobbying 
power, vote buying, or simply the fact that poor and less educated 
individuals have lower participation rates in elections, even in industrial- 
ized countries (e.g., Edsall, 1984, or Conway, 1991, for the United 
States). Conversely, p < ? corresponds to a populist bias reflecting either 
the ideology of a nondemocratic leftist regime ("dictatorship of the prole- 
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tariat") or the bargaining power of powerful unions. To get simple ex- 
pressions, assume moreover that the distribution of initial endowments 
in each generation is lognormal: 
Inwi- X (m, 2). (15) 
The pivotal voter or pressure group then corresponds to the wealth level 
w' defined by P((w* - m)/A) = p, where 0is the c.d.f. of a standard normal. 
Equivalently, w* = m + AA, where A ~-1( p). Regimes with positive 
values of A could be called "elitist," those with negative values "populist." 
But since even Western democracies exhibit departures from A = 0, I will 
use a milder terminology and simply speak of positive or negative "wealth 
bias" in the political institutions.12 Substituting ln(w*/w) = AA - A2/2 into 
(14) yields the following results: 
PROPOSITION 2
1. Growth is higher, the more biased against the poor is the political system: 
ag/lA > 0. 
2. Intertemporal efficiency is maximized when the individual setting the tax rate 
is the one with the average endowment w. 
3. Achieving intertemporal efficiency requires more pro-wealth bias in a more 
unequal country: w' = w for A = A12. 
The very stark nature of these results may lead one to think that they 
reflect special assumptions rather than general insights. They do not. 
These are in fact robust features of most political-economy capital taxa- 
tion models with complete asset markets. This includes not only models 
where there is no useful role for the government (Persson and Tabellini, 
1994) but also those where taxes or subsidies are required to correct an 
externality (Bertola, 1993) or to finance some productive public invest- 
ment (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). The underlying intuitions are indeed 
straightforward. With complete markets wealth heterogeneity has no 
efficiency consequences; if preferences are homothetic, it does not even 
affect aggregates. To equalize the social marginal costs and benefits of 
taxation one need therefore only look at averages, which means adopt- 
ing the point of view of the individual with the "representative" en- 
12. See Verdier and Ades (1993) for a dynamic model of political elites, and Benabou (1995) 
for a discussion of alternative representations of the political system. I show there in 
particular that if political influence reflects absolute rather than relative wealth, with an 
elasticity A, the pivotal agent has rank AA and log wealth m + AA2. 
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dowment.13 Complete markets also imply that aggregate consumption 
growth rises with the interest rate; in steady state, the same applies to 
output growth. Maximizing growth thus means maximizing the rate of 
return on capital, thereby adopting the perspective of the individual 
with highest wealth relative to other sources of income. This includes his 
valuation of any complementarities, public inputs, or regulations which 
might affect the private return. 
The empirical literature seems to have somewhat shied away from the 
most direct testable implication, namely (1), focusing instead on a more 
indirect, second-order effect: the differential impact of inequality on re- 
distribution and growth across political regimes. The claim, first made 
by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and taken up by Perotti (1992, 1996) and 
others, is that the negative effect of inequality discussed in Proposition 1 
should be stronger in "democracies" than in "nondemocracies." While it 
does relate to some valid intuitions, there are two problems with this 
argument. 
1. I know of no formal proof or model. Upon reflection, this is probably 
no accident. Such claims concern the cross partial second derivative of 
the growth rate, with respect to income distribution and regime. Not 
only is it rare that cross partials can be signed unambiguously, but in 
this instance the growth rate (or equivalently, the tax rate) is deter- 
mined by the first-order condition of the decisive agent-whether a 
dictator, landowning elite, or powerful union. Its cross partial thus 
inevitably involves the third derivative of that agent or group's objec- 
tive function, and therefore cannot be signed without restrictive func- 
tional assumptions.14 
2. Whatever its sign, any differential effect of income distribution across 
political regimes must surely depend on the direction in which one 
moves away from pure democracy. A similar criticism was formulated 
by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), who pointed out that even dictators are 
subject to political pressure, whether through riots or bribes. What 
should matter is how inequality affects the desire for redistribution of 
their constituency. 
13. This reasoning implicitly assumes linear taxation, as in all the literature under discus- 
sion. My model yields the same result even with progressive taxation, because in 
equilibrium everyone invests the same amount (all that matters is the threat of 
taxation). 
14. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) and Persson and Tabellini n the working-paper versibn of 
their 1994 article show how restricting the political rights of different classes affects 
growth (an effect similar to dg/ld here). But neither paper provides results on how the 
political regime alters the effect of inequality on redistribution and growth (d2T/d;dA 
and d2g/dAdA in my model), which is the issue under discussion here. 
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Elaborating on these remarks, I shall now formally examine the cross- 
effects of political institutions and inequality, A and A, on redistribution 
and growth. When voters or constituents located at the pth wealth per- 
centile are decisive, the equilibrium tax rate is given by their first-order 
condition: ln[l - +(r)] = AA - A2/2, where ) was defined in (14). This 
implies 
ar /- 1 (r) T /1(- r) 
-=(a-A)( =( - A) and - =- A '( ) (16) 
a'4 0<1(T) /A 0 (r) 
hence 
a- 1- (T-) [L ( (T )]. (17) (Aa4 f(T1) 0 <'(T)2 
The first term in the large square brackets is negative, but the second one 
depends on the curvature of ln(l - 0).15 This is a complicated expres- 
sion, even for A close to zero. One could of course evaluate it numeri- 
cally. Alternatively, observe that when A is small, the second term is 
dominated by the first. Together with similar derivations for the growth 
rate, this allows me to prove an amended version of the "democracy and 
inequality" conjecture: 
PROPOSITION 3 As long as inequality is not too large, its positive effect on 
redistribution and negative effect on growth are weaker, the less favorable to the 
poor is the political system: a2r/adAd < 0 and a2g/aAaA > 0. 
Compared to democracies, inequality should have more effect on redis- 
tribution and growth in left-wing, populist regimes, and less effect only 
in right-wing or wealth-biased systems.16 Note also from (16) that in this 
latter case taxes first decline, then rise with inequality: aT/lA 5 0 as A , 
A. Distributional conflict initially shifts policy to inefficiently low levels of 
taxation, but the growing skewness of the income distribution eventu- 
ally tilts the balance of power back towards the poor. The regressive 
nature of taxes or capital subsidies in this range (r < 0 for A _ 2A) need 
15. The expression multiplying (A - A)A measures the concavity of the optimal tax rate 
with respect to the log income of the tax setter; it reflects the third derivative of 
preferences, as argued earlier. Note that by using the first-order condition to character- 
ize the tax rate preferred by agents with w'/w = eA-2/2, I am implicitly assuming that it 
is always interior. A simple sufficient condition is e2 /2 < 1 - +(r). 
16. The earlier caveat about the inevitable reliance of any results concerning such cross 
derivatives upon specific functional and distributional assumptions naturally applies 
here as well. 
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not be taken literally, because one could incorporate some insurance 
value or public good which ensured that r remained positive. What is 
important, given the lack of any empirical link between inequality and 
redistribution evident in Table 2, is the nonmonotonicity of r with re- 
spect to A. The possibility of redistribution decreasing with inequality 
will play a still larger role once combined with imperfect capital markets 
in Section 3, and will therefore be discussed in more detail at that point. 
Propositions 2 and 3 make clear that what matters for growth (both 
directly and through the impact of income distribution) is not just the de- 
gree to which the political system departs from perfect democracy, which 
corresponds to [AI, but also whose political rights or influence are being 
curtailed. The empirical literature has nonetheless followed Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) in testing for differential effects of absolute democracy. 
Typically, countries are classified into "democracies" and "nondemoc- 
racies" on the basis of some composite index of political rights, freedom of 
expression and association, etc., such as those of Gastil (1982). The 
growth regression is then run separately for each subsample, or for the 
whole sample with a "democracy" dummy variable included-both by 
itself and interacted with income distribution. The results of these tests, 
summarized in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2, have generally been nega- 
tive. First, there is no consistent direct effect of democracy on growth 
(recall that this class of models predicts dg/l > 0). The latest study, Barro 
(1996), finds a nonlinear effect which I shall revisit in the next section. 
Turning to column (3), most other studies have not reproduced Persson 
and Tabellini's (1992, 1994) finding of a statistically significant differential 
impact of inequality across democracies and nondemocracies. Moreover, 
the sign of the estimates varies from one study to another. But since what 
is really measured in such regressions is the effect of IAI and AIl A rather 
than A and AA, I see these results as less damaging for the theory than 
those of the direct tests discussed in Section 2.4. It should be feasible in 
future work to provide more discriminating tests by distinguishing be- 
tween left- and right-wing regimes, at least for some subset of countries.17 
2.6 CONSUMPTION TAXES AND LABOR SUPPLY 
One potential explanation for the fact that redistribution does not appear 
to depress investment or growth is the presence of credit constraints, as 
I will show later on. But even with complete markets this need not 
17. One case which does not suffer from this problem is the historical sample of Persson and 
Tabellini (1994), where political institutions are represented by the fraction of the popula- 
tion which did not have access to an income-based or wealth-based voting franchise. 
This corresponds closely to A itself, and is therefore a more appropriate regressor than 
any postwar democracy index. The resulting estimate of dg/dA is nonetheless negative, 
although not significant. The cross-effect is not estimated in this set of regressions. 
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happen: nothing in principle prevents progressive taxation, transfers, 
minimum wages, and the like from being combined with a consumption 
tax or investment subsidy to maintain accumulation at the appropriate 
level. Indeed, value-added and sales taxes account for a much higher 
share of government revenue in "welfare state" European countries 
than, say, in the United States or Japan. 
Going back to the model, suppose that a proportional consumption tax 
is introduced and its revenue used to subsidize investment. First-period 
consumption is now c' = (1 - t)(w1 + b' - k'), investment (1 + a)k , and 
second-period pretax income y' = {r[(1 + a)k'] (w)l -}1-T(9)T. Balanced bud- 
gets require t(w - k) = ak, where letters without superscripts still denote 
aggregates. It is easily verified that, for any rate of redistribution r: 
1. Agents still save the same fraction s(r) of their income, so that the 
investment rate is s(r)(1 + a). 
2. The consumption tax rate unanimously preferred by agents is t*(T) = 
pf8T/(1 + pfp3). Thus the more progressive the income tax, the greater 
the recourse to consumption taxes. 
3. The resulting investment rate never departs from its first best level: 
s(r)(1 + a) = p/3/(l + pf3) = s(O). 
4. Introducing elastic labor supply, by replacing the first-period income 
wi with wil1 and the preferences (1) with U = Inc - 81 + plnd, leaves 
these results unchanged. As to the growth rate, it becomes g(r) = lnr 
+ lns(0) + lnl(T), where 1(T) = [1 + p,3(1 - T)]/6 is agents' common 
labor supply.18 
This simple extension of the model makes clear that it is only when 
redistributive policy is restricted to capital taxation that increases in redis- 
tribution automatically translate into intertemporal distortions, thereby 
generating results like Proposition 1. A related conclusion emerges from 
Bertola's (1993) two-factor model, where labor supply is fixed. He shows 
that when redistribution takes the form of investment subsidies rather 
than factor taxation, wealthy agents want less of it than poor ones, as it 
depresses the value of the existing capital stock. Therefore the poorer the 
median voter relative to the mean, the higher the growth rate. Of course, 
when labor supply is elastic, redistribution depresses effort and this de- 
cline in 1(r) still lowers the growth rate. Note, however, that the magni- 
tude of this effect is smaller than that of s(r)-even with linear disutility of 
labor, which puts an upper bound on distortions to labor supply. 
18. Similar results obtain when labor is less than infinitely elastic, but the formula for 
aggregate labor supply is now more complicated because agents choose different levels 
of effort l(7). 
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2.7 WHAT OF LAND REFORM AND PUBLIC EDUCATION? 
Formalizing the broad idea of a link between distributive conflict and 
growth is an important contribution of the pure political economy 
models discussed above (e.g., Bertola, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Persson and Tabellini 1994). The specific mechanism on which they 
focus, however, appears somewhat at odds with some of the motivat- 
ing issues and evidence. For instance, when interpreting their empir- 
ical results, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) refer to the idea that land 
reform was an important factor in the growth performance of Japan, 
Korea, and other Asian countries, especially when compared to Latin 
America. Similar claims are often made concerning the role of public 
investment in primary and secondary education, which mostly ben- 
efits the poor and lower middle class. This means that if Latin 
American or African countries did not grow as fast as Asian ones it 
is-among other things-because they failed to redistribute, at least 
initially (land) and perhaps also along the way (education).19 Yet the 
only transfers allowed in this class of models are those detrimental to 
growth. Public schooling and any kind of redistribution affecting peo- 
ple's ability to invest simply have no place under complete asset mar- 
kets. Land reform and similar reallocations of property rights which 
could reduce future distributional conflict are only envisioned as off- 
the-equilibrium-path events, in the form of one-time, unanticipated 
capital levies. But if one-time redistributions are so beneficial, they 
should occur systematically at high levels of inequality (Brazil and 
South Africa come to mind). To avoid this time inconsistency one 
needs to explain what is impeding such transfers, and perhaps why 
this constraint may be relaxed following a war or major crisis. More 
generally, countries face a tradeoff between the benefits of redistribu- 
tion and its incentive or reputation costs; both aspects should be ex- 
plicitly incorporated into the politico-economic game. This is the task 
to which I now turn. 
For redistribution to potentially have any growth benefit, in addition 
to costs, it must of course take place before investment is completed. But 
altering the timing of transfers is not sufficient: the reader will easily 
verify that none of the earlier results change if the government redistrib- 
utes investment expenditures (or capital itself but prior to production) 
according to the scheme 
k= (ki)1-'(k), (3') 
19. In 1945 the adult literacy rate in South Korea was only 22%; thirty years later, it was 
over 90%. 
32 * BENABOU 
where k is defined by the budget constraint 
()1 (k) T(k di= ki di (4') 
and second-period income is left untaxed: yi = y = r(ki)P(w)l1-. This 
policy corresponds for instance to a land reform (redistributing plots of 
size k), but one which is anticipated by agents. Equivalently, one can 
think of redistributing education budgets across rich and poor school 
districts, as done implicitly in countries which have a national system 
of education finance, and explicitly in an increasing number of U.S. 
states in response to constitutional court mandates. Finally, if one 
thinks of physical capital, redistributing investment expenditures is 
equivalent to taxing large investments and subsidizing small ones: 
agents investing k1 face a price p(ki) = (ki'k)'7/l-T).20 But whatever the 
context may be, as long as agents are not liquidity-constrained, such 
redistributions-or the threat thereof-can only distort first-best invest- 
ment decisions. 
3. Growth and Political Economy with Imperfect 
Asset Markets 
3.1 DIRECT EFFECTS OF INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION 
Let me now consider the very same model as above, but with missing 
credit markets: agents have no possibility of borrowing from one an- 
other, for instance due to a severe moral hazard problem (there is no 
way to enforce repayment). Later on I shall relate the model to others 
which make credit frictions explicit. I naturally focus on the case where 
redistribution occurs in time to affect the resources available for invest- 
ment, namely (3')-(4'). With no access to a loan market, agent i's optimi- 
zation problem is the same as (5) before, except that bi is now constrained 
to zero: 
max(ln(w - ki) + pln{r[(ki)l-T(k)T]wl -}). (5') 
The optimal investment is therefore 
20. It might seem more natural to simply tax first-period wealth w'. But since it is here 
exogenously determined for each generation, this would be equivalent to an unantici- 
pated capital levy. Formalizing redistribution as affecting investment expenditures 
enables me to capture its disincentive effects while simultaneously allowing it to 
occur in time to affect potential liquidity constraints. Straightforward income taxation 
with dynastic or infinite-lived agents leads to very similar expressions (Benabou, 
1995). 
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pk' 3( - )w' 
k' = =S(T)W'. (18) 1 + pp(l - r) 
Whereas everyone previously invested a fraction s of aggregate income, 
they now invest that same fraction of their own income. The govern- 
ment's balanced-budget condition (4') then defines k to be k = swz, with 
(zw/w) =W 
- 
T/E[(w)l-T]. (19) 
This yields the second-period income for agent i: 
yi = rs (wi)3(1-) w w-13. (20) 
Summing over all agents, the growth rate of aggregate income is given 
by 
y (E([(w,)1-l]) 
g() - In Y =lnr + 3lns(r) - In E[(w') ]) , (21) 
wgr) E[(w')1] 
where r is the tax rate chosen by the current generation. With dynamic 
linkages still specified as in Section 2.2, this is also the intergenerational 
growth rate: g(rt) = ln(wt+l/wt ) = In (y,/Yt-l). The first two terms repre- 
sent the growth rate with frictionless loan markets, derived in (9). The 
last term is negative for , < 1 due to Jensen's inequality, and vanishes for 
fp = 1. A more unequal distribution of resources, in the usual sense of a 
mean-preserving spread in wi, tends to increase this loss and thereby 
slow down growth. A particularly simple expression obtains when en- 
dowments are lognormally distributed, lnw' - X(m,A2), which I will 
assume from now on: 
g(t) = lnr + 1lns(r) - 3(1 - 3)(1 - r)2A2/2. (22) 
The intuition is straightforward. With /3 < 1 individuals face decreasing 
returns to investment. Reallocating funds from rich to poor relaxes the 
latter's credit constraints, allowing them to earn a higher return. Because 
the government is in no better position than potential financial intermedi- 
aries to monitor borrowers and ensure that they repay, this more effi- 
cient allocation of investment can only be achieved together with a net 
transfer to the poor. This in turn depresses savings incentives, as in the 
case of perfect capital markets. The same two effects are present when 
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evaluating intertemporal efficiency: the objective function of a planner 
with no distributional concern now equals 
W(r) Inc + plnd = V(T) - p/(1 - 8)(1 - r)2A2/2, (23) 
where V(T) corresponds to the complete-markets case. 
PROPOSITION 4
1. Under any given policy 7, inequality reduces growth and intertemporal effi- 
ciency. This loss decreases with the extent of pre-investment redistribution. 
2. Growth is hill-shaped with respect to redistribution, and the growth- 
maximizing tax rate increases with inequality. 
These results are related to those of Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee 
and Newman (1993), Perotti (1993), or Aghion and Bolton (1997) but with 
some differences. In those models the effects of inequality and redistribu- 
tion on growth depend critically on the initial distribution of wealth. This 
is because investment involves a minimum project size, generating a 
threshold level of wealth below which agents do not invest, or do not 
leave enough to their offspring for them to invest. Increasing growth 
means maximizing the number of people above this threshold, and in the 
early stages of development this may require concentrating resources on 
a lucky few or on some emerging middle class. This nonconvexity was 
originally seen as a key ingredient in models with explicit credit ra- 
tioning, especially in generating multiple long-run equilibria (poverty 
traps).21 To demonstrate that multiplicity can arise solely through the 
feedback from distribution to factor prices (see Section 3.6), Piketty (1997) 
does away with indivisibility by simply augmenting a standard Solow 
model with moral hazard. His neoclassical, concave technology again 
implies that inequality is always harmful and redistribution towards the 
poor beneficial-abstracting of course from incentive effects, which he 
does. Thus Piketty's model, incorporating the microfoundations underly- 
ing the rationing of credit, validates the similar result obtained by simply 
closing down the loans market, as I have done here following Loury 
(1981), Tamura (1991), and Benabou (1996a). 
21. Another potential appeal is its ability to generate Kuznets-type dynamics, as the range 
of increasing returns initially causes some measures of inequality to increase. Eventu- 
ally, inequality decreases as aggregate growth pulls everyone out of the poverty trap 
through a decline in the scarcity of capital (Aghion and Bolton, 1997) or through 
positive spillovers from the better-educated segments of society (Galor and Tsiddon, 
1993). 
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3.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Because asset market incompleteness is difficult to measure, there has 
been very little direct testing of its implications for growth and distribu- 
tion.22 Columns (7) and (8) in Table 2 show the results from Perotti 
(1994), who uses the loan-to-value ratio for mortgages as an indicator of 
credit availability and finds it to affect the investment rate positively and 
significantly. Moreover, this effect is stronger where the share of the 
bottom two quintiles is lower (that coefficient is significant only at the 
10% level). Similarly, the negative effect of inequality on investment rises 
with credit frictions, as predicted by the model. 
Evidence of a more indirect nature can also be considered. For in- 
stance, if liquidity constraints are impeding investment by the poor or 
lower middle class, any form of progressive transfer will contribute to 
relaxing them. By contrast, government consumption will not, except 
perhaps for civil servants. If anything, the taxes needed to finance it will 
aggravate wealth constraints. This differential effect is remarkably consis- 
tent with the empirical evidence discussed earlier: the estimated contri- 
bution of transfers to growth is generally positive, that of government 
consumption generally negative. The effects of public education expendi- 
tures also deserve attention. Column (5) of Table 2 shows that these 
generally promote growth. In the absence of credit constraints, increases 
in public spending on education would be offset by decreases in private 
spending (unless the two are complements), and therefore would not 
contribute to growth. To the extent that they require higher levels of 
distortionary taxation they would even have a negative effect, as in 
Becker and Tomes (1979).23 
The development literature also provides some valuable evidence, 
even if it does not directly relate to aggregate growth. First, it appears to 
22. There is of course an empirical literature linking financial development and growth, 
but it does not directly connect to the personal or functional distribution of income and 
the consequences of redistributive policies, which represent our main concerns. More 
closely related is the literature devoted to credit constraints on the investment of small 
firms, e.g., Beranke and Gertler (1989). 
23. An interesting issue is the degree to which government transfers are actually progres- 
sive. Alesina (1995) shows that a significant fraction of health and especially education 
expenditures is often captured by the middle 40%, with even the top 20% appropriat- 
ing a large share in some Latin American countries. The size of transfers is thus not as 
good an indicator of social equity as might appear. With respect to growth, however, 
these observations are not inconsistent with the idea that redistribution tends to relax 
wealth constraints on investment. First, even Alesina's data suggest that a significant 
amount of resources generally reaches the bottom 40%. Moreover, the key issue is 
what segment of the population has the highest marginal return on investment; in a 
poor country this could include parts of the middle class, as observed earlier when 
discussing the effects of fixed costs. Naturally, institutional reforms which could mini- 
mize transfers to the truly well off would always be beneficial. 
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be a robust finding that credit rationing and the lack of adequate insur- 
ance significantly constrain the investments of poor farmers away from 
profit-maximizing levels and compositions. See for instance Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin (1993), or the comprehensive surveys by Binswanger and 
Deininger (1995) and Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1995). Informal risk- 
sharing and consumption-smoothing arrangements play an important 
role but are only limited substitutes for well-functioning markets (Town- 
send, 1995). This literature also provides evidence of the decreasing 
returns which are central to the resulting inefficiency: whether in devel- 
oping or developed countries, the family farm is usually the most effi- 
cient unit of production. Inadequate access by peasants to credit for 
buying land, agricultural inputs, or equipment is one of the main causes 
of concentration in land ownership; others are the favorable tax treat- 
ment of agricultural income and various subsidies which benefit wealthy 
farmers most. Diminishing returns also occur in education, according to 
empirical estimates of the private and social returns to primary, secon- 
dary, and tertiary schooling (e.g., Psacharopoulos, 1993). 
3.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH MISSING ASSET MARKETS 
Let us now examine how inequality affects the efficient and equilibrium 
amounts of redistribution and the corresponding growth rates, by study- 
ing the interactions of political economy and imperfect asset markets. I 
continue to focus on the case where first-period endowments are 
lognormal and to omit time subscripts. Using (20), individual i's welfare 
is equal to: 
Ui(r) = V(r) - [1 + pj3(l - r)2]A2/ 2 + [1 + p,3(l - T)](lnw' - m). (24) 
It can be shown that Ui is strictly concave over all r > _, where I = -(1 + 
l/p3)112 < -1 was taken to be the most regressive tax feasible. Except for 
the richest individuals who prefer the corer solution (ri = T for lnw' - m 
> (p3)-1V'(r) + (1 - T)A2 > 2A2), each agent's ideal tax rate ri is then 
given by the first-order condition U'i(r) = 0; it decreases with own in- 
come lnw1 and increases with inequality A. Agents richer than lnw1 = m + 
A2 = lnw + A2/2 favor regressive taxes, while all others, including the 
individual with the average endowment w, desire progressivity. To com- 
pare these private optima with the social one, let us next rewrite: 
Ui(r) = W(T) - p/2(1 - r)2A2/2 + [1 + p,3(l - )](lnw' - m). (25) 
This leads to the following results. 
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PROPOSITION 5 
1. A social planner concerned only with intertemporal efficiency W would set a 
positive tax rate rP(A), increasing in A. 
2. The preferred tax rate of the agent with median wealth is above this efficient 
level. 
3. The preferred tax rate of the agent with average wealth is below the efficient 
level if (1 - f3)A2/4/ > (2/3 - 1)/(2 + p), and above in the reverse case. 
The first result is intuitive, given that redistribution now has not only 
efficiency costs through s(r) but also efficiency benefits, proportional to 
A2. The second one has a familiar ring, although it should be noted that 
the median voter's preferred policy now maximizes ex ante or aggregate 
welfare, Ei[ULi()]. Most striking is the third result. In the previous class 
of models, the agent with average wealth always chose the efficient 
policy. Now there are two opposite forces which make him "unrepresen- 
tative." The first is the progressivity of the tax scheme, whereby for r > 0 
all those below z > w gain at the expense of those above. Previously, 
redistribution was a threat which discouraged savings but did not materi- 
alize in equilibrium, as everyone invested the same amount. With liquid- 
ity constraints investments reflect wealth levels, allowing the average 
individual to join in "soaking" the very rich (differential productivities 
would yield a similar result). The opposite effect, which tends to make 
him choose too little redistribution, is his failure to internalize the social 
losses from liquidity constraints, which are proportional to (1 - f3)A2. As 
seen in (10), the missing credit market does not affect him at all, because 
he does not want to borrow or lend. In this sense he is the least representa- 
tive of all agents, as both richer and especially poorer ones are affected. 
When (1 - 3)A2 is large enough or simply when /3 < , this effect domi- 
nates the progressivity bias and the average agent chooses an ineffi- 
ciently low tax rate, possibly even less efficient than that of the median 
voter.24 Democracy has its virtues, after all. 
To explore in more detail the effects of political institutions and inequal- 
ity on redistribution, let the pivotal agent or group correspond once 
again to the pth percentile, with p = ((A). Substituting lnwi = m + AA 
into (24) and setting U'L(r) = 0 leads to the following results: 
PROPOSITION 6 
1. Growth and intertemporal efficiency are hill-shaped with respect to the degree 
of wealth bias in the political system, A. They are maximized at AG > Aw > 0. 
24. If P < , this is always the case for A small enough; see the proof of Proposition 5. 
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2. If the pivotal agent is at or below the median (A - 0), taxes increase with 
inequality; such increases are always inefficient and reduce growth. 
3. If the pivotal agent is of higher rank than the median (A > 0), taxes are U- 
shaped with respect to inequality. Tax cuts induced by rising inequality are 
always inefficient and can also reduce growth if 3 is not too close to 1. Tax 
increases induced by rising inequality have the opposite effects up to some 
point, beyond which their contribution to intertemporal efficiency and growth 
becomes negative. 
The first result provides a potential explanation for Barro's (1996) find- 
ing that growth is maximized at some intermediate level of democracy, 
and more generally for the absence of any monotonic relationship be- 
tween the two. See Table 2, column 2, with the usual caveat about 
measuring IAl rather than A. Note that asset market incompleteness and 
tax distortions are both critical for this nonlinear effect of the political 
system on the growth rate. In models such as those of Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) or Bertola (1993), the presence of public investment or 
spillovers does not change the fact that restricting the political rights of 
the poor always increases growth, as explained following Proposition 2. 
A polar opposite is Saint-Paul and Verdier's (1993) model where nondis- 
tortionary taxes are used to finance public education, supplementing 
wealth-constrained private expenditures. As a result, growth increases 
monotonically with redistribution, and therefore with -A. The model 
presented here can be seen as combining both forces, resulting in an 
interior solution for the growth-maximizing political system. 
As far as equilibrium taxes and welfare are concerned, results (2) and (3) 
also apply in the complete-markets case.25 The difference is only one of 
degree: because the optimal level of r now increases with A, inequality- 
induced tax increases are now less inefficient and tax decreases more 
inefficient. With respect to growth, however, the losses from credit con- 
straints lead to a new and potentially important explanation for its nega- 
tive correlation with inequality: Proposition 6 shows that more inequality 
can lead to less redistribution, which in turn leads to less growth (see also 
Benabou, 1995). 
3.4 DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF INEQUALITY 
We saw earlier that for a given policy 7, inequality reduces growth and 
intertemporal efficiency. Does this remain true when policy responds 
25. This can be shown directly using (13) and (14), or one can simply set , = 1 in (25), in 
which case credit constraints entail no efficiency loss. Both the complete and missing 
markets cases accord with the claim in Benabou (1995) that it is when redistribution is 
ex ante efficient that the standard effect dr/dA > 0 can be reversed. In that model such a 
reversal can occur with progressive taxes, T > 0. 
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endogenously? A straightforward application of the envelope theorem 
to (23) shows that such is the case when redistribution is determined by 
an efficient planner, i.e. r = P(A) = argmax{W}. The more interesting 
case is when it arises through the political process. Let r*(A,A) denote 
this solution to the first-order condition U'i(r) = 0 of the pivotal group: 
(p3)-1V'() + (1 - r)A2 - AA = 0. (26) 
We can write 
dg ag ag\ aTr* 
dA aA \dTrf=T* ad 
and similarly for W. The first term in this expression, which holds policy 
fixed, is always negative, while the last two were analyzed in Proposi- 
tion 6. In a pure democracy or a populist system (A - 0) taxes increases 
with inequality; moreover, the equilibrium rate is always above rT and 
hence in the range where W and a fortiori g decline with redistribution. 
With positive wealth bias, on the other hand, taxes are U-shaped with 
respect to inequality. Lower taxes have a positive effect on savings incen- 
tives but a detrimental one on credit constraints. Whether growth rises 
or falls thus depends on the extent to which agents face decreasing 
returns and have unequal resources. The effects on W are similar, except 
that since it puts positive weight on first-period consumption, it does not 
"overvalue" low taxes as g does. In particular, Proposition 6 established 
that where rising inequality leads to tax cuts, these are never efficient. 
PROPOSION 7 
1. If the pivotal agent is at or below the median (A - 0), inequality reduces both 
growth and intertemporal efficiency. 
2. If the pivotal agent is of higher rank than the median (A > 0), inequality still 
lowers W as long as P is not too large. For /3 close to 1 inequality may 
increase intertemporal efficiency, but this can only occur through an increase 
in redistribution. 
3. For A > 0 inequality reduces growth if A is not too small and 13 not too close 
to 1. In the opposite case, inequality increases growth through a decline in tax 
rates. 
While the direct effect of inequality on growth (through wealth con- 
straints) often dominates, its interaction with the indirect one (policy 
response) can generate a fairly complex relationship between these vari- 
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ables. Sorting out the two channels through a structural model should 
nonetheless be possible, and even appears desirable. Particularly inter- 
esting is the third result, which calls attention to the fact that if political 
power is sufficiently correlated with financial or human wealth and if 
capital market imperfections are not too severe, greater inequality may 
actually increase growth through a decline in redistribution. A similar 
insight will arise from the model of social conflict discussed in Section 4: 
what matters for sociopolitical stability (which promotes growth) is not 
income inequality per se, but the inequality of income relative to the 
inequality of political power. Where institutions or the political technol- 
ogy are such that increases in the former translate into increases in the 
latter, instability (or here, taxation) need not rise, and may actually fall. 
3.5 ENDOGENOUS INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS AND 
SOCIAL MOBILITY 
Up to this point I have maintained a feature inherited from the complete- 
markets models discussed in Section 2: even though it plays a critical role, 
the pretax distribution of endowments is completely exogenous. In 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), as here, it simply reflects, period after pe- 
riod, the fixed distribution of agents' abilities. In Bertola (1993) and 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) the distribution of wealth is indeterminate: the 
constancy of factor prices combines with the absence of idiosyncratic 
uncertainty to ensure that any initial distribution will reproduce itself 
from one period to the next. By contrast, the endogenous evolution of the 
wealth distribution is at the core of incomplete-markets models. This 
includes those which focus on the decentralized market outcome (Baner- 
jee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; 
Piketty, 1997), those which analyze potential redistributive policies 
(Loury, 1981; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Benabou, 1996a; Fernandez 
and Rogerson, 1994), and those which endogenize redistribution as a po- 
litical outcome (Perotti, 1993; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Verdier and 
Ades, 1993; Saint-Paul, 1994; Benabou, 1995). Making these distributional 
dynamics explicit is also necessary to address the issue of social mobility, in 
the line of Becker and Tomes (1979). The intergenerational persistence of 
income and wealth disparities is at least as relevant a social concern as the 
level of inequality per se. The question of how policy affects persistence, 
both in theory and in practice, is therefore of considerable interest. 
The model developed in this paper is easily amended to deal with 
these issues. Until now it was assumed that intergenerational linkages 
operated only at the aggregate level. Whether through an economy-wide 
spillover or through universal public education, they resulted in a trans- 
mission mechanism of the form wt1 = Et+lYt. Let me now recognize that 
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the transmission of human capital operates largely within the family or 
at the level of small communities which are fairly homogenous in socio- 
economic status: school districts, neighborhoods, social networks, etc. 
Consider first the pure human-capital spillover interpretation, under 
which wt+1 = Et+lYt is simply replaced by 
Wt+ = et+lYt. (8") 
With perfect capital markets this changes nothing, because y\ = r(st)wt 
for all agents. Family income remains i.i.d., with variance A2 = Var[lne] 
= r2. With imperfect capital markets, on the other hand, equation (20) 
now implies that family income follows the law of motion 
lnw'i+ = lnei + lnr + 31ns(re) + 8(1 - rt)lnw' + '3rt lnzb 
+(1 - /)lnwt, (27) 
where rt is the tax rate chosen in period t, and zt is given by (19). Income 
remains lognormally distributed, and its intergenerational persistence is 
given by 3(1 - rt). As a result, inequality follows the autoregressive 
process 
A2 = a2 + p2(1 _ r7)2A2 (28) 
The alternative mechanism of intergenerational transmission is educa- 
tional investment, now privately or locally funded. With the preferences 
(1'), agents all want to invest the same fraction 1 - y of second-period 
resources in their child's human capital. Therefore wt1 = ed, where the 
constant has again been normalized to one. In the absence of credit 
markets, d' = yt, so (27) and (28) remain unchanged. Complete markets 
lead to somewhat different individual dynamics, but these retain the 
property that redistribution reduces the persistence of wt. From here on I 
shall focus on the first case, since it has implications for aggregate 
growth whereas the second one does not. Recall in particular that 
g(rt) = lnr + plns(-t) - P(1 - 3)(1 - (1-)2A2/2. 
Together with (28) this makes clear that once the dynamics of income 
distribution are endogenized, an additional, long-run benefit of redistri- 
bution appears. A marginal rise in Tt causes the same distortion s'(rt) as 
before, but now the growth losses due to the combination of wealth 
inequality and borrowing constraints are reduced not only in the current 
period [(1 - rt)2A2/2 is lower], but also in all future periods: A2+k is lower 
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for all k. This homogenizing effect means that long-run growth is maxi- 
mized at a higher level of redistribution than previously.26 This, in turn, 
requires a lower degree of wealth bias A in the political system, which 
must therefore be closer to pure democracy. 
This brings me to the question of the long-run behavior of the econ- 
omy and its income distribution, which I will discuss both theoretically 
and empirically. As before, let taxes be determined in each generation by 
the preferred policy of the pivotal group: rT = T*(At, A), defined by (26). 
Together, rt and At then determine next period's distribution, according 
to (28). Recall now from Proposition 7 that when A < 0, r*(At, A) is 
increasing in At, so that endogenous redistribution acts as a stabilizing 
feedback on inequality. 
PROPOSITION 8 If the median voter or some agent located at a lower percentile 
chooses the tax rate in every period (A < 0), the economy converges to a unique 
steady-state growth path (r,, A,, g,) where r, = T*(A,A,), A2 = r2/[1 - /2(1 - 
T.)2], and the growth rate is 
/3(1 - P)(1 - %)2ca2/2 
g. = Inr + p3ns(r) -p(1 - )1 - T)2 .2 (29) 1 - /32(1- -r)2 
As one would expect, a stronger populist bias shifts this steady state 
towards greater redistribution and less inequality. 
3.6 MULTIPLE LONG-RUN DISTRIBUTIONS 
With any positive influence of wealth on the political process, on the 
other hand, taxes initially decrease with higher inequality At, before 
increasing again. By (28) this tends to increase At+1, hence also 7t+1, and so 
on. The feedback from policy to intergenerational dynamics is now po- 
tentially destabilizing. 
PROPOSITION 9 If the pivotal agent is of higher rank than the median (A > 0), 
there can be multiple steady states. In that case, intertemporal efficiency W 
increases as one moves from a less redistributive, more inegalitarian steady state 
to one where r. is higher and A, lower. This is a fortiori true for ex ante welfare 
Ei[Ui], and may also be true for the growth rate g~. 
Proposition 9 and equation (27) on which it is based illustrate more 
generally the common principle through which multiple long-run distri- 
26. Agents' myopic preferences (1) or (1') imply that they do not internalize this variance 
effect when setting the current tax rate, just as they do not internalize the mean effect 
of Yt on wt+1. With forward-looking altruism or infinite lives, both are internalized to an 
extent which reflects the discount factor; see Benabou (1996a). 
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butions arise in models with imperfect capital markets: a negative gen- 
eral equilibrium feedback of inequality on mobility, via a worsening of credit 
constraints.27 In Banerjee and Newman (1993) this feedback operates 
through the real wage. A more unequal distribution of wealth means 
more people who do not have the collateral required to become either 
self-employed entrepreneurs or employers of labor. Instead they become 
workers, collectively depressing the wage and therefore the bequest 
which they leave to their children. Conversely, wealthy dynasties benefit 
from paying lower wages. This makes for low social mobility and persis- 
tently high inequality. Building on Aghion and Bolton (1996), Piketty 
(1996) generates a related form of "mobility trap" through the interest 
rate. When wealth is scarce and distributed very unequally, there are few 
lenders, many would-be borrowers, and interest rates are very high. 
High interest rates, in turn, aggravate poor agents' borrowing constraints 
and make mobility more difficult. Thus both low total wealth and high 
dispersion persist into the next period. Across steady states, aggregate 
income and wealth vary negatively with the interest rate. In the present 
model, as in Saint-Paul (1994) and Benabou (1995), the feedback is 
through policy; taxes and transfers or public funding of education serve 
as imperfect substitutes for the missing credit market. When greater in- 
equality leads to lower redistribution, this again reduces mobility and 
makes disparities more persistent, by worsening the credit constraints of 
poor agents. This is why transfers and growth can be positively corre- 
lated across steady states in spite of savings distortions, as stated in 
Proposition 9. A related form of multiplicity occurs through segregation 
in models of endogenous community composition. In Durlauf (1996b), 
for instance, sufficient disparities in wealth and/or education cause well- 
off families to form small homogeneous communities rather than share 
the fixed costs with a larger, more heterogeneous population. Cut off 
from the tax base and positive local spillovers which richer, more edu- 
cated neighbors would have provided, poor families again experience no 
or little upward mobility.28 
Are countries all headed towards the same long-run distribution of 
income, as in Proposition 8, or are there permanently different trajecto- 
27. Multiple equilibria can also arise from a nonconvexity at the level of individual families, 
as in Galor and Zeira (1993). With enough idiosyncratic uncertainty, however, a poor 
family escapes the poverty (no investment) threshold with positive probability; the 
wealth process is then ergodic and the long-run distribution unique. 
28. See also Benabou (1993, 1996b), Durlauf (1996a), and Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 
1994) for related sorting effects, as well as Kremer and Maskin (1994) on segregation by 
skills in the labor market. In the latter case, when segregation occurs it is always 
efficient. But if one combined this production model with credit-constrained accumula- 
tion of human capital, multiplicity could occur once again. 
44 * BENABOU 
ries in terms of both level and inequality, as in Proposition 9? I shall 
argue in Section 5 that this issue of convergence in distribution is of even 
broader interest and merits to be investigated empirically, then take the 
first few steps in that direction. But first I turn to the last of the three 
main theories linking distribution and growth. 
4. Social Conflict and Property Rights 
In the median-voter model (at least when taken literally), expropriation 
occurs through an orderly process: votes are counted, then everyone 
submits to the majority rule. At the other extreme are models where 
agents or interest groups can simply grab part of someone else's wealth. 
It is generally presumed that this becomes more likely when the gap 
between rich and poor widens, and that the resulting decline in the 
security of property rights discourages investment, thereby impeding 
growth. 
A number of related ideas have been formalized in the literature. 
Grossman (1991, 1994), Acemoglu (1995), and Grossman and Kim (1996) 
focus on the allocation of resources between productive, predatory, and 
defensive activities in the context of one-shot interactions between indi- 
viduals or economic classes. Using "dynamic commons problem" games 
with either Markovian or trigger-type strategies, Tornell and Velasco 
(1992), Tornell (1993), and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) study how 
growth is affected by distributional conflict between long-lasting interest 
groups or coalitions. The first two papers emphasize the role and 
sources of interest groups' ability to opportunistically extract rents from 
others; they do not directly deal with inequality. Benhabib and Rus- 
tichini (1996) show how the extent to which social conflict constrains 
growth may depend on the economy's level of development, as well as 
on a form of inequality which relates to equilibrium selection rather than 
initial conditions: among the continuum of subgame-perfect equilibria of 
their model, the one with fastest growth involves equal utility for all 
players. 
I shall seek here to convey the essence of this literature and make 
some new points by means of a much simpler model, which relates the 
underlying structure of the problem to a familiar object: the prisoner's 
dilemma. The model has close links to that of Benhabib and Rustichini 
(1996) but also incorporates ingredients from several of the others. 
4.1 A PRISONER'S DILEMMA WITH CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
Consider an economy constituted by two homogeneous groups of 
agents, labeled 1 and 2; allowing for n groups would be straightforward. 
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In period t each can choose to either moderate its claims to the economic 
pie ("cooperate") or try and extract a disproportionate amount, at the 
expense of the other group ("deviate"). Formally, let kt be the economy's 
capital stock at the start of the period. The consumptions of groups 1 and 
2 are given by the following shares of kt: 
1\2 C D 
C a,(l - s), a2(1 - s) a,(l - s) - (32 - S2)s, a2(1 - s) + f2S 
D al(1 - S) + f1s, a2(1 - s) - (P1 - 81)s Y1, 72 
When both sides cooperate, a total of ct = (1 - s)kt is consumed, while skt 
is reinvested according to the linear technology: 
kt+ = r(kt- ct). (30) 
The parameters a1 < a2 = 1 - a, capture the distribution of income in the 
nonconflictual outcome, which can be thought of as the market solution. 
They could for instance reflect the competitive shares of capital and 
labor. In the single-period game, however, (C, C) is never a Nash equilib- 
rium: by deviating, group i can appropriate an extra share of the pie, 
equal to a fraction 0 < f,i - 1 of the resources skt which would otherwise 
have been reinvested. Of this opportunistic gain, a fraction 0 < 8i - Pi 
comes from raiding the capital stock and fPi - 8i is at the direct expense of 
the other group's consumption. Following most of the literature, it is 
assumed that transfers or rents unilaterally extracted from the rest of 
society can only be consumed.29 The underlying motivation is that other- 
wise they could be seized back by the opposite side. That consumption is 
less vulnerable to expropriation than investment does not mean that it is 
entirely safe, however. The possibility of indirect taxes and subsidies, 
import levies, or outright theft implies that not all of the deviator's gain 
need come from investment, as is often assumed in the literature; ,3i and 
29. Or alternatively, reinvested in some asset with a lower return, such as deposits abroad; 
see Torell and Velasco (1992). One could also introduce into the model direct or 
opportunity costs of engaging in expropriation, by making noncooperative payoffs 
sum to less than (1 - s)k,+ 8iskt. Thus deviator i's private gain (net of resources spent on 
expropriation) fiskt could be strictly less than the sum of the other side's (net) consump- 
tion loss, say 4)sk,, and the reduction in investment, 8iskt. For simplicity I shall not do 
so, thus imposing fi = 4i + 8i. All costs and payoffs in the stage game are of course 
specified exogenously; to endogenize them would require modeling agents' resource 
allocation problems between productive, offensive, and defensive activities, as in 
Grossman (1991, 1994) and Grossman and Kim (1996). Using these papers' terminol- 
ogy, the fi's reflect the private efficacy of the predation technology and the i's (more 
generally, the 8i's and the 8i + 4i - fi's) its social or aggregate "destructiveness." 
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5i are conceptually distinct, and will be seen below to have different 
implications. 
On net, a unilateral deviation by some group i reduces the capital 
stock by a factor 1 - 8i. In a situation of open conflict where both groups 
try to appropriate resources from each other, they will be led to 
overconsume even more: for simplicity I assume that under (D, D) all 
capital is consumed, 7y + Y2 = 1, but this is not essential for the nature of 
the results. The shares yi represent each side's strength in the political 
struggle, that is, its power. They could be related to the ai's and ij's, as 
discussed later on, but in general need not be.30 
Let me assume from here on that ai(l - s) - (,-i - 6_i)s < yi for all i, 
which implies that the unique equilibrium of the one-shot game is (D, 
D). Consider, however, agents who are infinite-lived, with preferences 
Ut = ps(c' )l-a 
s=O 
where 1/a > 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and prl-a < 1. 
In each period they play the game described by the above payoffs. The 
capital stock kt constitutes a state variable which makes this a dynamic 
game, rather than simply a repeated one. I begin by focusing on the 
"first-best" case where there is only one group, or equivalently a central 
planner who can carry out lump-sum transfers. Starting with ko = k, 
playing (C, C) in every period yields the intertemporal utility U = 
u(s)kl-, where 
(1 - s)1-a 
u(s) = 
-a (31) 1 - p(rs)1 
The resulting growth rate is constant and equal to rs. This strategy is 
preferable to (D, D), where the entire capital stock is consumed immedi- 
ately, if u(s) > u(0) = 1. As depicted on Figure 1 for the case r = 3, p = 
0.4, a = 0.25, the function u(.) is strictly concave and maximized at s* 
pl'arla- . This is the value which the planner would choose if he could 
select the savings rate continuously. One could let s = s*, but more 
generally I will simply require that s belong to the interval (s, 1) over 
which u(s) > 1, so that rs is indeed the better of the two growth rates 
achievable in our simple economy. The main question is whether it can 
be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium when groups have the 
30. For instance, Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) impose a symmetry restriction similar to yi 
2' 
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Figure 1 INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS ON GROWTH 
as ri/a' or r/ci 
increases 
u(5) 
ability to behave opportunistically and extract more than their coopera- 
tive share from the common pool of resources.31 
4.2 INCOME INEQUALITY, POWER INEQUALITY, AND GROWTH 
Playing (D, D) in every period is always an equilibrium. This high- 
conflict, low-growth outcome will naturally serve as the punishment to 
which players revert whenever someone has deviated from cooperative 
behavior. These trigger strategies will sustain the first best if, for all i, 
(aYi)-aU(S) [ai(l - S) + piS]- a + p[rs(l - i)yi]l-a. 
The first term on the right-hand side is group i's current consumption 
when it deviates and grabs extra resources equal to a fraction 3is of the 
capital stock. The second term measures its payoff in the following pe- 
riod where both groups play D, liquidating the capital stock. Rewriting 
this condition leads to: 
PROPOSITION 10 If the incentive compatibility constraint 
u(S) > ( 1 - S + ) - 
\a,I 
+-p rs(1 - 'i) 1 - vi(s) 
- 
c[ai 
31. Were agents also allowed to consume less than ai(l - s), such deviations could be 
shown to be unprofitable as long as s is not too far below the optimal savings rate s* 
(specifically, aif(s) - 1 where f(s) = (1 - s)(s/s*)/(1l - s(s/s*)a) is a decreasing function 
with f(s*) = 1). 
(32) 
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is satisfied for both groups, continued cooperation and growth at the rate rs is 
sustainable as an equilibrium. If it is violated, the only equilibrium is the noncoop- 
erative one with no growth. 
Several interesting results can now be obtained by examining condi- 
tion (32), which is illustrated on Figure 1. 
1. Incentive compatibility typically holds when s is sufficiently low, and 
is violated at high enough values.32 This means that there is a maxi- 
mum sustainable growth rate which is constrained by conflict over the 
distribution of income, as in Benhabib and Rustichini (1996). This 
maximum growth rate rsmaX falls as maxi{f3i/ai} or maxi{yi/ai} rises.33 
2. Growth becomes harder to sustain when some (or both) group's abil- 
ity to expropriate the other through unilateral, opportunistic devia- 
tions is disproportionate to its "normal" share of the economic pie: for 
any given s, (32) ceases to hold as 1i/ai becomes large enough. Conse- 
quently, max declines. 
3. Income inequality also limits the economy's growth rate, for a given 
allocation of power and expropriating ability. For instance if 81 = 12 
and y, = 2, the incentive compatibility constraint is binding for the 
group with the smaller income share, a, < a2. Deviations come from 
the poor, and are more likely the poorer they are. In this case it may 
be in the interest of the rich to voluntarily transfer wealth to the poor 
through land reform, education subsidies, a minimum wage, or trade 
protection: group 2 is better off if its own share a2 can be permanently 
reduced to increase al. This scenario, formalized by Grossman (1994, 
1995) in a static context, arises here from the desirability of growth. 
4. However, it could be the poor who are more vulnerable to expropria- 
tion or exploitation; one can think of small peasants versus large 
landowners. If y,l/a < y2/a2 while /3l/a = 32/a2, for instance, it is the 
rich's threat to deviate which reduces accumulation. The model thus 
makes clear that what matters is not inequality in the (equilibrium) 
distribution of income per se, as often claimed in the literature, but 
32. For instance as s tends to zero, u(s) - 1 + p(rs)'1- > 1 + p(rs(1 - 8i)(^/ai))1-a - vi(s) as 
long as (1 - 5,)(yi/ai) < 1. Conversely, u(l) = 0 < vi(1) always and u(s) = 1 < vi(s) 
whenever ,i/ai > 1. 
33. In the simple game described above there are only two sustainable growth rates, the 
cooperative one rs and zero. But suppose now that there is in fact a continuum of such 
games, indexed by s, which can be played; all other parameters are invariant. Among 
values of s for which cooperation can be sustained, both groups will prefer the one with 
the constrained-optimal growth rate, s** = min{s*, sma}. They will also be unanimous in 
preferring the s** game to any other with a single, uncooperative equilibrium if u(s**) > 
maxi{(iy/ai)1-a}. If this condition is not satisfied, the Pareto frontier includes both the s** 
and the zero-growth outcomes. 
Inequality and Growth * 49 
inequality in the relative distribution of earning and political power: since 
a1 + a2 = 7y + y2 = 1, the minimal value of maxi{y,/ai}, which maxi- 
mizes growth, is 1.34 Note also that the important role played by off- 
the-equilibrium-path payoffs is a potential problem for the empirical 
implementation of such game-theoretic models. I shall return to it 
below. 
5. The more of the expropriation comes from capital, as opposed to 
other people's consumption, the easier it is to sustain cooperation: vi 
is decreasing in Si. 
4.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The findings from most studies which have examined the links between 
inequality, conflict over property rights, and growth are summarized in 
columns (9) and (10) of Table 2. Two broad measures of "instability" or 
"insecurity" have been considered. The first consists of indices of sociopo- 
litical instability constructed from various combinations of protests, 
strikes, government turnover, political violence, coups, revolutions, and 
the like (e.g., Venieris and Gupta, 1986; Londregan and Poole, 1990; 
Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Alesina et al., 1996; Perotti, 1996). Because of 
the potentially serious simultaneity problem, most studies estimate a joint 
model of growth and instability. The other form of "instability" is more 
directly linked to the issue of property rights. It is measured by various in- 
dicators of "country risk" sold by specialized firms to international inves- 
tors, such as sovereign default risk, expropriation or nationalization risk, 
rule of law, enforceability of contracts, quality of the bureaucracy, corrup- 
tion, etc.; see Keefer and Knack (1995), Svensson (1993), or Barro (1996). 
Column (9) shows that both types of security deteriorate as a result of 
increased income inequality. In turn, column (10) shows that both greater 
political turmoil and lower protection of property rights decrease invest- 
ment and growth. The general idea that inequality exacerbates social 
conflict, which in turn makes property rights less secure and reduces 
growth, thus appears well supported by the evidence; indeed, it is emi- 
nently plausible. The specific channels through which this occurs, how- 
ever, remain to be clearly identified. Svensson (1993) finds that when both 
political-instability and property-rights variables are included in invest- 
ment regressions, only the latter are significant; on the other hand, 
greater political stability implies more secure property rights, as does a 
more equal income distribution. Keefer and Knack (1995) report that 
34. Deviations by the rich also occur in Barbosa, Jovanovic and Spiegel (1996), but the 
context is different. Agents with stochastic endowments enter into an ex ante efficient 
income sharing agreement. Ex post, they may renege and fight over the appropriation 
of total resources. Their decisions are based on current payoffs only. 
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when one controls for initial GDP in the investment equation, political 
instability becomes insignificant. 
I also wrote support for "the general idea" rather than "the models" 
because the link between the latter and intuitive or empirical notions 
of political instability is still somewhat incomplete. This can be seen 
from the representative model presented above. First, note that con- 
trary to common interpretation, uncertainty or unpredictability is really 
not part of the story. The mechanism formalized here and in most of 
the literature is not one where greater inequality leads, through more 
acute political conflict, to a mean-preserving spread in the return to 
investment (and even this is known to have an ambiguous effect). It 
has no up side and thus leads, very much as in the voting models, to 
a lower mean return due to increased expropriation, or the threat 
thereof. Second, with perfect information about actions and payoffs, 
equilibrium is achieved without any "friction" or resource dissipation. 
Just as there is no reason for delay to occur in a bargaining model with 
symmetric information, there is no role in these models for strikes, 
riots, coups, assassinations, etc. Incorporating incomplete information, 
as for instance in Alesina and Drazen (1991), will generate delays and 
resource-dissipating struggles along the equilibrium path; but the ex- 
tent to which these occur will reflect not so much the distribution of 
income (and power) as the extent of agents' uncertainty over what this 
distribution is. Why the two should be related is not obvious. Given 
imperfect information, resources would be dissipated as well in stan- 
dard political-economy models: the voter who turns out to be pivotal 
(say, median) will eventually have his way, but only after costly politi- 
cal campaigns, lobbying, and legislative maneuvers. This will make 
the two types of model a little more similar yet, as would the incorpo- 
ration of strategic, dynamic concerns into the voting model: reputation 
of the pivotal class for fiscal restraint, trigger strategies on the part of 
the private sector, and so on. 
5. Convergence: On to Second Moments (and Higher) 
Are countries converging to the same level of inequality? This question 
may seem unusual, and indeed it has not been taken up by the empiri- 
cal literature. Yet it is important, on several counts. First, ascertaining 
the facts is in itself of interest. It is common knowledge that Latin 
American countries tend to be more unequal than European ones, 
themselves less equal than East-Asian ones. Similarly, the specter of 
U.S.-style inequality is often used in Europe to justify high levels of 
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redistribution and minimum wages. But are all these gaps really perma- 
nent, or inexorably narrowing?35 
Second, it can shed light on the relevance of models with multiple 
steady states and history dependence of the income distribution. In 
particular, it provides an indirect test of the joint mechanisms of credit- 
market incompleteness and negative feedback from inequality to social 
mobility which underlie these theories, as explained in Section 3.6. 
Third, there is now a vast empirical literature examining international 
convergence in per capita incomes. This variable is after all only the first 
moment of each country's income distribution. Once augmented with 
idiosyncratic shocks, most versions of the neoclassical growth model 
imply convergence in distribution: countries with the same fundamentals 
should tend towards the same invariant distribution of wealth and 
pretax income.36 Barring unexplained differences in "tastes" for equity 
or in the distribution of innate abilities, persistent differences in the 
degree of inequality would conversely indicate the presence of some 
form of increasing return or complementarity in the economic or politico- 
economic structure. 
Having raised the question of convergence in higher moments, I shall 
make here a first pass at trying to answer it. Ideally, one would apply to 
an international panel of inequality measures the same tests which are 
now standard in the literature on the convergence of first moments: 
regressing rates of change on initial values, examining whether cross- 
sectional dispersion falls over time (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1992), or the more complex tests of Quah (1993) and Durlauf and John- 
son (1995). The binding constraint, however, is data: no such panel 
35. Looking at the OECD countries in the 1980s, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1995) find no 
relation between initial levels of inequality and changes in inequality during that de- 
cade. If anything, there is some evidence of polarization at the extremes, of the type 
suggested by Proposition 9. The largest increases occurred in the United Kingdom and 
the United States, which had the highest initial levels, suggesting that these countries 
may be converging to a high-inequality steady state. The smallest increases occurred in 
Italy, France, Portugal, and Denmark; thus Denmark could be converging to a low- 
inequality steady state. While this exercise provides valuable information, it suffers 
from being based on a small number of countries, several of which are observed over a 
very short interval of time. 
36. See for instance Banerjee and Newman (1991), Ayagari (1994), Bertola (1995), or the 
case without credit constraints in Piketty (1997) for examples of this ergodicity prop- 
erty. Some of these models even include credit rationing (agents can borrow less than 
what they could repay with probability one), but the feedback from the wealth distribu- 
tion to credit constraints discussed in Section 3.6 is either absent, because the latter are 
specified exogenously, or else as the economy grows it becomes too weak to generate 
multiplicity (Aghion and Bolton, 1997). Departing from homothetic preferences by 
introducing a minimum consumption level as in Chatterjee (1994) could probably lead 
to history dependence, but the stochastic version of that model still remains to be 
studied. 
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Table 3 INEQUALITY ACROSS SEVEN MAIN REGIONS 
(Top 
Gini Adj. Gini Bottom 3rd+4th Top 20%)/ 
Decade (%) (%) 20% Quintiles 20% (bottom 20%) 
Mean 
1960s 39.99 41.52 6.18 35.65 47.84 9.03 
1970s 39.34 40.92 6.03 36.49 47.24 8.89 
1980s 37.47 39.92 6.52 37.56 44.73 8.31 
1990s 38.28 41.63 6.43 37.24 45.47 8.46 
Standard deviation 
1960s 10.03 10.77 2.17 4.29 8.91 4.52 
1970s 10.54 11.23 2.77 3.74 8.76 4.29 
1980s 8.33 9.43 1.50 2.97 5.97 3.73 
1990s 7.79 9.46 1.58 3.52 6.66 3.82 
Regions: Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia / Pacific, South 
Asia, OECD and High Income, Eastern Europe. 
Source: Computed from Deininger and Squire (1995a, Tables 5-7). 
exists over a long enough period. The closest substitute is a new data- 
base recently put together by Deininger and Squire (1995a). It signifi- 
cantly expands the coverage of previous datasets, both over time and 
over countries, to the extent that one can think of it as a panel with (still 
many) missing cells. I shall also use data for a sample of OECD countries 
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). It contains far fewer observa- 
tions, but considerable effort has been devoted to making the numbers 
comparable across countries. 
I start with a bird's-eye view of the issue, by comparing the seven 
main regions of the world for which Deininger and Squire (1995a) pro- 
vide summary statistics on inequality: Latin America, Sub-Saharan Af- 
rica, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia/Pacific, South Asia, OECD 
and High Income, and Eastern Europe. For each region they constructed 
decadal means of various inequality measures, by averaging all available 
observations from the 1960s to the 1990s. From these numbers I com- 
puted both the world average and the cross-regional standard deviation 
of each inequality measure. These are reported in Table 3. 
While these are somewhat crude statistics, they point to some interest- 
ing facts.37 For the mean level of inequality in the world, the picture is 
37. One would want to weight regions by population or income, for instance. The "ad- justed Gini" in the second column of Table 3 refers to an adjustment made by Deininger 
and Squire (1995a) to observations based on expenditure rather than income surveys. 
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one of relative stability; some small and gradual improvement is visible 
until the 1980s, after which the situation starts to deteriorate. Cross- 
regional variations in inequality, on the other hand, show a clear decline. 
The coefficient of variation falls by 19% for the Gini coefficients, 30% for 
the shares of the bottom quintile, 22% for the shares of the third and 
fourth quintiles, and 37% for the share of the top quintile. Note also that 
almost all of this "convergence" occurred between the 1970s and 1980s.38 
I next went to the full sample and ran simple convergence tests for the 
Gini coefficients across individual countries, to the extent permitted by 
the data. I chose the Gini rather than particular shares or share ratios 
because it was available for more observations, and because it relates 
more directly to the transition equation (28) in the formal model.39 In the 
first test I computed for each country the average yearly rate of change in 
the Gini coefficient between the first and last available observations. I 
then ran a regression of this variable on a constant and the initial value of 
the Gini. The results are reported in Table 4, for four samples. 
The first sample consists of the 69 countries for which I was able to 
compute the rate of change.40 The second one is perhaps the most reli- 
able: it restricts attention to the 25 countries for which the data are most 
comparable, having been obtained from similar types of surveys (gross 
household income). The third one consists of the 19 OECD countries in 
the full sample. It is complemented by the LIS dataset, where I was able 
to perform the same regression on 16 countries; the typical time interval 
is much shorter, however. The results are consistent across the four 
columns: the negative and generally significant signs indicate mean re- 
version in inequality. To reduce the chance that these results were due to 
measurement error on the first observation (which biases the coefficient 
towards negative values), I ran the regression with the exact same right- 
hand-side variables but replacing the left-hand side by the average rate 
of change between the second and last available observations. For the 
The former typically bias the Gini coefficient downward. The adjustment consists of 
adding to the Gini the average size of the bias, which Deininger and Squire compute to 
be about 6.6% in their dataset. 
38. Given that there are only seven observations in each case, the differences in standard 
deviations or coefficients of variation documented in Table 3 are, unsurprisingly, not 
statistically significant. In my view this does not make them any less intriguing, espe- 
cially in the light of the other evidence discussed below. 
39. For a lognormal, the Gini is a monotonic function of the variance of logarithms, A2. I 
also ran many of the regressions with the logarithms of the Ginis instead of the levels. 
This led to similar results. 
40. Restricting the sample to those countries where at least ten years separate the first and 
last observations leads to throwing out nine data points, with essentially unchanged 
results. 
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Table 4 CONVERGENCE TESTS USING GINIS' AVERAGE RATE OF 
CHANGE 
Samplea N cb Initial Ginib R2 
1 69 0.641 (3.07) -0.015 (-3.04) 0.061 
2 25 0.755 (2.65) -0.017 (-2.54) 0.262 
3 19 1.22 (4.49) -0.036 (-4.75) 0.480 
4 16 2.56 (1.48) -0.060 (-1.34) 0.050 
aSample 1: Deininger and Squire's dataset (1995a); sample 2: subset of countries using gross household 
income surveys; sample 3: subset of OECD countries; sample 4: LIS dataset. 
bHeteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parenthesis. 
first three subsamples the coefficient remained virtually unchanged and 
statistically significant (t-statistics ranged from 1.9 to 3.0). For the LIS 
dataset, it became positive and insignificant; however, that regression 
contained only 12 data points (with the trend often computed over dates 
separated by just a few years) as opposed to between 18 and 62 for 
Deininger and Squire's dataset. 
One problem with this test is that inequality and its rate of change are 
computed over different periods for different countries. The incomplete- 
ness of the dataset does not permit one to run the standard cross-sectional 
regression over a fixed ten- or twenty-year period. To generate a usable 
panel it is necessary to interpolate some missing data. This is what I did, 
using neighboring observations when required to obtain Gini coefficients 
for 1970, 1980, and 1990. I was then able to run inequality convergence 
regressions for the periods 1970-1980 (Table 5a, 33 countries), 1980-1990 
(Table 5b, 38 countries) and 1970-1990 (Table 5c, 25 countries). The first 
column presents the basic regression of the change in the Gini on the 
initial value and a constant. The coefficient is negative and significant at 
the 5% level for 1970-1980, similar in size but significant only at the 10% 
level for 1980-1990, and small and insignificant for 1970-1990. One source 
of concern is that the data from different countries may not be directly 
comparable. Some numbers come from expenditure surveys, others from 
income surveys; some pertain to household income, others to personal 
income; finally, most concern gross income, but some are for net (after tax) 
figures.41 I deal with this issue in three different ways, all of which lead to 
similar results. First, I include in the regression dummy variables for 
observations generated from expenditure data, personal-income data, 
and net-income data (expdum, perdum, and netdum); the results are 
reported in the second column of Table 5. Alternatively, I first regress both 
41. Deininger and Squire (1995a) discuss these problems, of which the first one is the most 
serious. 
Table 5 CONVERGENCE TESTS FOR GINIS' 
(a) 1970 to 1980 
Sample 1 (N=33) 
Variable dgini8070 dginires8070 
c 9.02 13.93 0.98 
(2.49) (2.39) (0.99) 
gini70 -0.231 -0.320 -0.347 
(-2.69) (-2.64) (-3.19) 
expdum70 7.98 
(2.49) 
perdum70 4.10 
(0.73) 
perdum80 -4.68 
(-.93) 
netdum70 2.65 
(0.72) 
netdum80 -9.56 
(-2.28) 
R2 0.101 0.155 0.213 
sdev70 10.23 8.98 
sdev80 9.98 8.10 
Sample 2 (N=24) 
dgini8070 dginires8070 
7.66 17.36 1.39 
(1.93) (2.44) (1.21) 
-0.190 -0.364 -0.337 
(-1.98) (-2.59) (-2.63) 
5.37 
(2.47) 
2.26 
(0.30) 
-5.80 
(-0.77) 
6.72 
(2.27) 
-13.28 
(-2.91) 
0.053 0.142 0.191 
10.18 8.09 
10.20 8.27 
Sample 3 (N= 18) 
dgini8o7o 
18.65 
(2.34) 
-0.411 
(-2.37) 
0.249 
8.45 
7.34 
Sample 4 (N=9) 
dgini8o7O dginires8O7O 
18.42 -1.29 
(1.38) (-0.71) 
-0.496 -0.743 
(-1.39) (-1.93) 
-0.020 
5.45 
8.28 
0.247 
6.67 
7.09 
Table 5 CONTINUED 
(b) 1980 to 1990 
Sample 1 (N=38) Sample 2 (N=24) Sample 3 (N= 16) Sample 4 (N= 15) 
Variable dgini9o8o dginires9080 dgini908o dginires9o8o dgini9080 dgini9o80 dginires9080 
c 10.93 14.11 0.04 10.51 15.72 -0.13 15.25 31.49 -1.94 
(2.14) (2.13) (0.04) (1.64) (1.35) (-0.09) (1. 41) (3.73) (- 1. 10) 
gini80 -0.275 -0.334 -0.342 -0.252 -0.377 -0.372 -0.358 -0.934 -0.903 
(-1.83) (-1.73) (-1.84) (-1.39) (-1.21) (-1.56) (-1.26) (-3.48) (-2.55) 
expdum8O -2.32 -1.02 
(-1.73) (-0.29) 
perdum80 -2.32 -2.26 
(-0.65) (-0.41) 
perdum9o 4.23 5.05 
(1.27) (0.86) 
netdum80 6.44 4.30 
(2.11) (0.81) 
netdum90 -9.32 -8.91 
(-4.26) (-2.18) 
jZ2 ~ 0.120 0.175 0.144 0.070 -0.040 0.123 0.081 0.682 0.579 
sdev80 9.08 7.55 10.20 8.27 8.18 6.80 6.66 
sdev90 8.97 7.61 10.55 8.74 8.89 4.14 4.86 
(c) 1970 to 1990 
Sample 1 (N=25) Sample 2 (N=24) Sample 3 (N= 14) 
Variable dgini9o7o dginires9o7o dgini9o7o dginires9070 dgini9o7o 
c 2.72 
(1.08) 
gini7O -0.039 
(-0.64) 
expdum7o 
perdum7o 
perdum9o 
netdum70 
netdum90 
7.32 
(1.54) 
-0.141 
(-1.37) 
-0.54 
(-0.29) 
-2.96 
(-1.07) 
1.90 
(0.88) 
1.63 
(0.80) 
-3.23 
(-1.42) 
1.39 
(1.42) 
-0.214 
(-1.60) 
2.38 
(0.92) 
-0.028 
(-0.44) 
7.02 
(1.44) 
-0.130 
(-1.20) 
-0.62 
(-0.32) 
-2.78 
(-0.95) 
1.69 
(0.74) 
1.56 
(0.74) 
-3.13 
(-1.36) 
1.38 
(1.34) 
-0.216 
(-1.53) 
3.50 
(0.58) 
-0.460 
(-0.37) 
Sample 4 (N= 7) 
dgini9o7O dginires9070 
19.01 
(1.99) 
-0.542 
(-1.87) 
-0.74 
(-0.41) 
-0.576 
(-2.64) 
K~2 -0.030 -0.139 0.099 -0.039 -0.171 0.092 -0.069 0.024 0.243 
sdev70 10.37 
sdev90 10.60 
9.17 10.18 
8.74 10.55 
9.09 
8.73 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parenthesis. 
Sample 1: all countries for which beginning- and end-of-period data were available or interpolated. 
Sample 2: subset of countries for which 1970, 1980 and 1990 data were available or interpolated. 
Sample 3: subset of countries using gross household income surveys. 
Sample 4: available OECD countries 
9.08 
9.38 
4.26 
5.20 
6.30 
5.45 
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the initial and final Gini coefficients on these dummies (evaluated at the 
relevant years), then run the regression on the residuals ("dginires," third 
column of each table). Finally, I run the regression on the subset of coun- 
tries which used gross family income for both dates. These results, given 
in the "Sample 3" column of each table, are very similar to the previous 
ones. Once again there is significant evidence of inequality convergence 
from 1970 to 1980, much less so from 1980 to 1990, and none at all for the 
whole period 1970 to 1990. 
One problem which might explain the puzzling discrepancy between 
the first two results and the last one is that the data for each subperiod 
are for different subsets of countries. I therefore re-ran the regressions, 
with and without dummies, on yet another subsample consisting of the 
24 countries for which 1970, 1980, and 1990 observations were available 
(either from the original data or by interpolation). The results are pre- 
sented under the heading "Sample 2." Once again the estimates are all 
negative, with a drop in significance but not in magnitude from the first 
decade to the second, and a drop in both when moving to the full 
twenty-year period. A possible explanation would be for some countries 
to go from above to below the mean (say) during the first decade, then 
move back above during the second one. In the fourth, much smaller 
subsample of OECD countries, by contrast, the evidence of mean rever- 
sion seems stronger in terms of both magnitude and stability across 
periods. Overall, the regressions reported in Tables 5a to 5c consistently 
point to some mean reversion between 1970 and 1980, but the picture for 
the other periods is much less clear. It is interesting to recall that in Table 
3, the dispersion of inequality across major regions of the world experi- 
enced most of its decline between the 1970s and the 1980s. Looking 
across individual countries, on the other hand, one sees no evidence of 
any narrowing in the range of Ginis. The standard deviation ("sdev"), 
reported in the last two lines of each table, shows virtually no change 
during any of the two decades under consideration. 
The general picture which emerges at the end of this empirical exercise 
is thus a mixed one: general stability in the world distribution of Ginis, 
within which countries and regions seem to be experiencing some non- 
negligible amount of relative mobility. The question of whether there is ac- 
tual convergence or whether countries oscillate around distinct long-run 
levels of inequality still awaits a definite answer. This is perhaps not sur- 
prising given the rather preliminary nature of the analysis and, above all, 
the limitations of the data.42 My main purpose, however, was to put for- 
42. In particular, I have looked only at unconditional convergence. The potential effects of 
development on inequality (e.g., the Kuznets hypothesis) and the reverse links from 
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ward the issue of convergence in distribution as an important and essentially 
unexplored topic for empirical research. Hopefully, future studies with 
more sophisticated econometrics and better data (looking across states or 
regions as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) will help resolve the issue. 
Two related empirical questions also deserve serious investigation. 
One, motivated in particular by Proposition 9, is whether there is so to 
speak "convergence in redistribution." Are countries, or even industrial- 
ized countries, converging to the same relative size of the welfare state, or 
are there permanent differences in the social contract? Evidence on OECD 
countries provided by Lindert (1996) suggests the latter, but more formal 
tests on larger samples are needed.43 Another broad issue is whether 
educational, fiscal, or other forms of progressive redistribution actually 
increase mobility, as formalized in equation (27) and suggested by most 
models with imperfect capital markets. Recent work by Cooper (1996) 
studying the effect of state financing of education on the intergenerational 
mobility of families in poor communities suggests a positive answer. Mull- 
igan (1995), on the other hand, finds only mixed evidence that borrowing 
constraints affect the transmission of inequality. 
6. Conclusion 
Non-representative-agent growth theory has developed so rapidly in re- 
cent years that this tour is necessarily incomplete. First, I focused only on 
the effects of income or wealth inequality on growth, rather than the 
reverse. The first model's income distribution evolved endogenously in 
response to credit constraints and policy outcomes, but due to the 
homotheticity of preferences, technology, and tax schemes, it was not 
affected by the economy's level of development. I thus entirely abstracted 
from the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis, except when discussing the role of 
fixed costs. This choice reflects both space constraints and waning interest 
in the Kuznets curve, arising from its lack of empirical support in most 
recent studies. Similar homogeneity properties in the second model pre- 
cluded my examining whether sociopolitical conflict and extensive rent 
seeking are diseases more likely to afflict poor countries or rich ones (see 
Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996). Another level-dependent effect of in- 
come distribution arises in the "big push" theory formalized by Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). If industrialization requires a sufficiently 
inequality to growth studied in this paper suggest that the dynamics of mean income 
and income inequality should be examined jointly. 43. See Piketty (1995) and Benabou (1995) for models which seek to explain such persistent differences. 
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large domestic market to make increasing-returns technologies profitable, 
excessive concentration of wealth may represent an obstacle to growth. 
The relevant constraint, however, is the absolute economic weight of the 
middle class, which in a large country like India is considerable even with 
very high inequality. Keefer and Knack (1995) test the "big push" mecha- 
nism by including in growth regressions measures of market size such as 
population, total GDP, and openness to trade, both by themselves and 
interacted with income distribution. They find no support for the theory 
in their data. An empirically more successful direction of research con- 
cerns the links between income distribution, fertility, and development. 
Perotti (1996) finds that a greater income share of the middle class has a 
strong negative effect on fertility, and this in turn has a significant positive 
effect on growth. I did not discuss this mechanism, due to space con- 
straints and because there is yet no fully worked-out theory of distribu- 
tion, fertility, and growth which can robustly generate these correlations. 
Among the models which have begun to formalize some of these links, 
moreover, the kind of wealth constraints on educational investment 
which were extensively considered in Section 3 often play a critical role 
(e.g., Galor and Zang, 1993). 
Even for the three main theories which were examined in some depth, 
the analysis necessarily involved a number of simplifications. For conci- 
sion I abstracted from inherited ability, dynastic altruism, occupational 
choice, and effort decisions of workers, entrepreneurs, or rent seekers, 
as well as from spillovers and nonconvexities of any kind. All these 
elements have been incorporated in the literature, and their role men- 
tioned at various points in the paper. 
Where do we go from here? The political-economy and imperfect- 
capital-market models are now well understood and have reached the 
quantitative stage.44 While further developments (perhaps in relation to 
fertility or technology) will surely prove valuable, the gap between the 
scope of the theoretical literature and the scarcity of direct evidence makes 
further empirical work a high priority: signs of the adverse effects of 
redistribution on growth remain elusive (to put it mildly), and inferences 
about the role of credit constraints far too indirect. With respect to sociopo- 
litical conflict, there remains room for theoretical and empirical work to 
move closer to one another. Existing models provide many valuable in- 
sights but few robust results about the effects of income inequality on 
44. See for instance Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rill (1996, 1994) in the first case, Fernan- 
dez and Rogerson (1994) and Benabou (1996c) in the second. There also are many 
quantitative models where liquidity constraints impede consumption smoothing but 
not investment (e.g., Ayagari, 1994; Bertola 1995). Their focus and properties are thus 
rather different. 
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conflict, whether conflict will be open or latent (off the equilibrium path), 
fully predictable or uncertain. On the empirical side, the variances of policy 
and property-rights variables should be included in the regressions, so as 
to determine whether it is instability or just the average level of extralegal 
redistribution that matters. Examining the interaction between economic 
inequality and inequality of political power in determining the occurrence 
of open conflict also seems desirable. 
Coming full circle, it is tempting to conclude by asking: which of the 
theories linking distribution and growth considered in this paper best 
shed light on the experiences of South Korea and the Philippines? While 
this is not a substitute for detailed case studies [see for example Rodrik 
(1995) on Korea and Taiwan], one would expect the most relevant mecha- 
nisms to show up in basic indicators such as those compiled by Barro and 
Wolf (1989). Once again, the pure political-economy hypothesis of exces- 
sive redistributive pressure emanating from the poor, whether through 
the ballot box or the street, does not fare well. Public transfers in Korea 
were low, but still two and a half times higher than in the Philippines: 
3.71% versus 1.46% of GDP on average between 1970 and 1980. Education 
expenditures show the same pattern, with shares of 5.13% and 1.97% 
respectively.45 While the Philippines' government redistributed much 
less, it consumed a little more: 1.66% of GDP, versus 1.58% in South 
Korea. These numbers are broadly consistent with the credit-constrained 
human-capital accumulation hypothesis, and indeed Korea's educational 
investment skyrocketed past that of the Philippines: the enrollment rate 
in secondary education went from 42% in 1960 to 95% in 1985, as opposed 
to 50% to 65% for the Philippines. Similarly, for tertiary education Korea's 
1965 enrollment rate of 6% was far behind the Philippines' 19%; by 1992 
roles were reversed, with rates of 42% and 28% respectively. Another 
likely piece of the puzzle is the Philippines' much higher fertility rate 
(5.55% vs. 3.60% between 1965 and 1985), although the extent to which it 
reflects economic as opposed to cultural factors is unclear. 
Turning now to theories of social conflict and property rights, political 
instability does not appear very relevant in this instance, as the two 
countries experienced similarly high levels of turmoil. The Philippines 
had more revolutions and political assassinations, Korea more riots, 
coups, government crises, and constitutional changes. Their indices of 
45. Both the anecdotal evidence on the Philippines and the fact that 40% of health subsi- 
dies went to the richest 20% of the population (this number is cited by Alesina, 1995) 
suggest the type of path analyzed in Proposition 9, characterized by redistribution to 
the wealthy and low growth, or even Verdier and Ades' (1993) model of purely rent- 
seeking elites. Most of the Barro and Wolf (1989) data mentioned here are averages over 
1960-1985; the figures given below for tertiary education are from the World Bank's 
1986 and 1995 World Development Reports. 
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political rights and civil liberties were also very similar.46 The more dis- 
criminating indicators of property-rights protection discussed earlier 
(rule of law, enforceability of contracts, expropriation risk, corruption, 
etc.), on the other hand, put Korea distinctly ahead.47 This general secu- 
rity of property rights was probably instrumental not only in creating a 
favorable climate for business investment, but also in inducing Korean 
households to entrust much of their considerable savings to a state- 
controlled banking system, which in turn channelled credit towards the 
industries deemed strategic by the government, without excessive dissi- 
pation along the way. 
Appendix 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 Let us first study the properties of the function 
V(r) defined by (12). Clearly, (13) implies that it has a unique, global 
maximum at r = 0. Moreover, 
Vll(T) 1 + pf3(l - r2) (A.1) 
pf (1 - r)2[1 + pfP(1 - T)]2 
is positive if and only if T2 < 1 + 1/pp. Thus V is strictly concave on the 
policy domain (r, 1), where r -Vl +lI/p38. By (11), individual i's utility 
function UL(r) is of the form V(r) + (1 + p)ln(A + B-) and therefore also 
strictly concave on (z, 1). The envelope theorem then yields the claims 
which follow equation (11), as well as Proposition 1. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 The result for taxation was proved in the text. 
Next, note from (9) that 
1 2( g - Inr) _ sr() a2r (/ s'() )r dr 
18 dAdA s(T) dAdA dr s(r) A dA 
46. Barro and Wolf's (1989) data on the average numbers of these events per year for Korea 
and the Philippines are Strike = (0.00, 0.00), Revol = (0.31, 0.46), Riot = (2.12, 1.00), 
Assass = (0.12, 0.73), Coup = (0.09, 0.00), Crisis = (0.38, 0.08), Constch = (0.22, 0.09), 
Polright = (4.8, 4.7), Civlib = (5.0, 4.5). 
47. The earliest available data are BERI's (Business Environmental Risk Intelligence) 1972 
scores for bureaucratic delays, enforceability of contracts and nationalization potential. On a scale of 0 (worst) to 4 (best), Korea scored (2.1, 2.3, 2.6) and the Philippines (1.5, 
1.9, 2.2). This pattern is confirmed by the additional data available for the last ten 
years. The averages of these three BERI scores computed by Keefer and Knack (1995) 
over 1986-1995 were 2.2 and 1.7 respectively. The average ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) scores over 1986-1995 were 36.7 and 20.3, on a scale of 0 to 50. See Keefer 
and Knack (1995) for sources and definitions. 
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For A small enough, a2rdaAaA was seen to be negative, and the fact that 
a/TaA is proportional to A makes the second term again dominated by 
the first; hence the result. Similar derivations apply to intertemporal 
efficiency V. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 The first claim follows directly from (22). Differ- 
entiating this equation and using (6) also implies that 
1 
g'(r) 0 e - (1 - 13)A2. (A.2) (1 - T)2[1 + p8(l - T)] 
( 
Since the left side is increasing in r, g increases with r up to some Tg(A) E 
[T, 1), then decreases. This maximum is interior (and increasing in A) if 
and only if 
(1 - )A2 > . (A.3) (1 - Z)2[1 + p/3(1 - ) (A. 
As r < 
-1, it suffices for instance that (1 - f)A2 > 1/(4 + 8pB). Finally, 
the growth-maximizing tax rate is positive if 
1 
Tg(A) >0 o (1 - i8)A2 > . (A.4) 1 + pf3 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 Because W(r) is the sum of V(r) and a concave, 
quadratic function of r, it is strictly concave on (r, 1). The same state- 
ments hold for individual preferences UC(T), now given by (24). The 
social and (interior) private optima are thus respectively defined by W'(r) 
= 0 and U'i() = 0. In the planner's case, (23) implies that V'(rP) = -pf,(l 
- 3)(1 - TP)A2. The fact that V is strictly concave and maximized at zero 
then yields Claim 1, while Claim 2 follows from setting Inw' = m in the 
first-order condition U'`(T) = 0 derived from (25). 
Next, let Ta be the preferred tax of the agent with average wealth, lnw 
= m + A2/2. Clearly, Ta < TP if and only if U'a(TP) < 0, which by (25) is 
equivalent to W'(TP) + [p32(1 - TP) - pf/2]A2 < 0, that is, to 3(1 - TP) < . 
Equivalently, W'(1 - (2,f)-1) > 0, so by (23) and (13), 
'>1(23)l 1 (1 -f3)A2 1-(2p)- rTP > 1 - (2)-1 < (1 - ) 1 
- (2-1 
23- (2 3)-1(1 + p,(23)- ) 
4j8(2X3 - 1) (hence Clm 3. 2+p 
hence Claim 3. 
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Finally, let us show that when /3 < 1 there exists an interval where the 
tax rate Tm set by the median voter is less inefficient than that set by the 
average agent, i". As A goes to zero the median converges to the mean, 
and both Tm and a" converge to the planners' optimum, which is TP(0) = 
0. Therefore, from (25), W'(rT")lpt = [ - (1 - r)(1 2 = ( - P)A2 + o(A2) 
and W'(Tm)/p(3 = -/3(1 - rm)A2 = -3A2 + o(A2). Thus if f3 < and A is 
small enough, WN'(a) > -W'(rm), which implies (using Taylor expan- 
sions) that rP - T" > Tm - TP and therefore W(ra) < W(7m). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6 Strict concavity of individual preferences UL(r) 
implies that the equilibrium tax rate is uniquely defined by the first-order 
condition (26), or 
r( r, A) = (p)l'V'(r) + (1 - T)A2 - AA = 0, (A.5) 
as long as there is an interior solution T*(A, A) > r. Since kA < 0 < - 't it 
is clear that r* is strictly increasing in A. Proposition 5 showed that 
maximizing W requires Aw > 0; conversely, Aw < A, because for A > A, 
I(0, A,A) < 0 so r* is negative, implying W'(7*) > 0 since TP(A) > 0. The 
fact that growth is maximized at AG > Aw is obvious; conversely, as A 
increases towards the value which makes r*(A, A) equal to i, r*(A, A) 
falls below r7(A), implying g'(T*) > 0. Therefore AG is interior, as long as 
(A.3) is satisfied. This concludes the proof of Claim 1, which concerns 
the effects of A on equilibrium taxes r*(A, A). 
I now turn to the effects of A on r*, and the resulting contributions to 
W and g. The solution to (A.5) is interior for all A if and only if 
maxa[(p,/)-1V'(T) + (1 - )2-A2 - AA] > 0, or 
A2 -T 
_- < 
- (A.6) 4 1 + p/3(1 - 7) 
which will be assumed from here on [since r < -1, a sufficient condition 
is A2 - 4/(1 + 2p13)]. Equations (A.5) and (25) then imply 
W'(T*) = p3A,[A - P(1 - r*)l], (A.7) 
aT* 2A(1 - 7*) - A 
= 
. (A.8) 
a VA V"(*)/pp + A2 
Therefore, whenever rising inequality induces tax cuts, these are always 
inefficient: 
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a,r* 
-?-<0 ~ W' *)> 0. (A.9) 
aA 
For A ? 0 equations (A.7) and (A.8) imply ar*IaA > 0 and W'Qr*)< 0; 
hence g'Qr*) < 0 a fortiori. This proves Claim 2. For A > 0, aT*IaA > 0 if 
and only if 7* < 1 - A/2A, or equivalently l(1 - A/2A, A, A) < 0. 
Substituting (13) into (A.5), this means 
AI2A - 1 AlA 1 - pfA224\4 
+. -- -AA < 0 <* A > - 1+'2 A.(.10 (A/2A)(1 + pf3X/2A) 2 2 A 1+4A2I4 
Note now that (A.6) implies that pfA2I4 < 1, hence A > 0. Therefore T* is 
U-shaped with respect to A: it declines from T*(0, A) = 0 to a minimum f" < 
0 at A, then rises again towards 7*(o0, A) = 1, cutting the 7T= 0 axis at A = A. 
Finally, (A.5) shows that as A-- + Qo, 7* tends to one with 1 - 7* -0-/A, 
where 
1 A 
- ?(1-A-AAO => --+A0-AA=O 
1I - T e 
<* 0 - 1/0 - A, (A. 11) 
which has a unique solution 0 > 0 for each A. For further reference, note 
also that this limit is reached from below: 
V(A, A)E 2R, [1- T*(A, A)A <0. (A.<12) 
Let us now turn to the efficiency consequences of these variations in T* 
By (A.8), W'(T*) ? 0 if and only if 7* 1 - A/PA. Equivalently, *I' (1 - A/ 
pA, A, A) ? 0, or 
AA2A 1-A/PA 21 13 f-A/A 
- - A <* ' - 1 p -h/ 
'8A k(A/PA)(1 + ppA/pA) P)1+ pA/A 
A p - A2(1Ip - 1) 
A 1 + pA2(1IP - 1) 
Two cases are thus possible: 
Case (i). If A2 > p2/(1 - 1) then Wf(7*) > 0 for all A. Therefore, on the 
interval [0, A] where taxes decrease with rising inequality, these reduc- 
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tions in T* are always inefficient. On [A, +oo) taxes increase with 
inequality, although never sufficiently fast. One can also show that 
lima,, [1 - TP(A)] = (1 - 13)-12, which is less than 8 defined in (A.11) if 
and only if A2 > 82/(1 - P). 
Case (ii). If A2 < P/2(1 - f3) then W'(r*) > 0 on [0, A) and W'(r*) < 0 on (A, 
+o0), where 
- A[1 + pA2(1/3 - 1)] 4- l , 
' 
. (A.13) 3 - A2(1/- 1) 
Observe now that A > A > a. This implies that W'(r*) > 0 over the 
whole interval [0, I] where T* decreases with higher inequality, and 
even over a strict superset of the interval [0, A] where capital is subsi- 
dized (T* < 0). This is intuitive, as the planner always wants to set 
rP(A) > 0. Only once inequality has reached A does it drive equilibrium 
taxes r*(A, A) > 0 to excessively high levels. 
This concludes the proof of Claim 3, as far as intertemporal efficiency is 
concerned. 
It only remains to consider the growth effects of dr*IdA, that is, the 
sign of g'(T*). Using (A.2) and (A.5) one can write, as long as 7* $ 0: 
(1 - T,)42 _ AA 
g'(r*) > 0 
T 
< (1 - f)A2 7 *(1 - T*) 
A ) 
T 7 ( - -(1 - T*)[1 - (1 - 13)T*] > 0. (A.14) 
Note first that in the neighborhood of = 0+, where T7 0-, this condi- 
tion is never satisfied. This is intuitive, since the losses from heterogene- 
ity are of second order in A2, whereas the induced tax effects on savings 
are of first order. 
Next, consider the condition in the neighborhood of A defined by 
(A.10), where r* = 1 - A/2A < 0: 
sg(-*(4, A)) > 0 X 2 < 1-(1-) 1-- 
2-, 3 1 + A2/4 A2 1 
1p < 1-p 4 p -> . (A.15) 1- 1 
-p/A2/4 4 pp + (1 - 8)(1 + pA) 
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It is easily shown that the right-hand side is smaller than that of (A.6) if 
and only if (1 - 38)ITI > 1, or equivalently (1 - /)2(1 + l/p3) > 1. This 
inequality holds if and only if 8 is not too close to one, in which case 
there exists a range of A's satisfying (A.6) such that g'(r*(A, A)) > 0. In 
this parameter configuration, tax cuts induced by rising inequality just 
below A reduce growth, while tax increases which occur as A rises just 
above A tend to improve it. To show that this last result is not specific to 
the region of regressive capital subsidies (r* < 0), let us next examine 
g'(r*) at A = A. Since r*(A, A) = 0, (A.2) shows that: 
g'(T*(A, A)) > 0 <: 2 > 
. 
(A.16) (1 - /)(1 + P/S) 
Again it can be shown that the right-hand side is greater than that of 
(A.6) as long as j3 is below some fixed upper bound. In that case there 
exists a range of A's such that increases in inequality in the neighborhood 
of A = A+ generate tax increases to positive levels which still improve the 
growth rate. 
Finally, let us consider (A.14) as A -- oo and 1 - r* 0- /A. The condition 
becomes A > /0, which by (A.11) is equivalent to A2 _ p2/(1 - /). When 
this condition [which once more is compatible with (A.6) if and only if /3 
is not too close to one] holds, g'(r*(A, A)) > 0 even asymptotically: 
equilibrium taxes increase with inequality, but too slowly from the point 
of view of maximizing not only W but even g. When A2 < /2/(1 - 8), on 
the other hand, taxes eventually increase too fast with rising inequality, 
again whether from the point of view of welfare or from that of growth. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7 Claim 1 immediately results from Propositions 
4 and 6, or directly from (A.7)-(A.8). For A > 0, let us write out 
dW 
(pA)-' =-(1 - )(1 - *)2 
+ [A - A(l - *)][24(1 - -A(A.17) 
-V"(T*)I/pP + A2 
The numerator of the second term is a quadratic polynomial in A whose 
maximal value is [(2 - 3)(1 - r*)A]2/4. Therefore, (dWldA),=, < 0 as long 
as 
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(1- (1 () > (2 - )2 ( 
l-V)1ppl3>J2 4 
32 -V'(T*) 1 + p/3(l - T*2) 
< 
p 
<= (A.18) 
4(1 - ,) p3A2 A2(1 - T*)2[1 + p3(1 - T*)]2' 
by (A.1). Now, recall from (A.12) that A(1 - *) < 0 for all (A, A, 3), so 
the right-hand side is greater than 0-2[1 + p3(l - T)]-2. Provided 3 is 
below this value, dWIdA is therefore negative for all (A, A). For P close to 
1, on the other hand, it is clear that the second term in (A. 17) dominates. 
By (A.7) and (A.8) this second term is positive if and only if dr*ldA > 0 
and W'(r*) > 0, which occurs when A E (A, A), where these two bounds 
are defined by (A.10) and (A.13) (in which / can be set equal to 1). This 
concludes the proof of Claim 2. 
Consider now growth. First, we showed earlier that if A2 < 32/(1 - /), 
then g'(r*) becomes negative as A becomes large enough. Since or*/lA > 
0 for A > A and dgldA < 0 always, this proves that dg/dA < 0 for A large 
enough in this case. To obtain a result which is independent of A and to 
make clear the role played by /3 < 1, let us use (A.2) and (A.5) to 
compute: 
(p) dg I [(1 - 3)r*(1 - r*)a - (1 - T*)A + A][2A(1l -*) - A] 
dA T=T Tr*[-VP(*)lpP + a2] 
-(1 -/3)(1 - ( *)2. (A. 19) 
Focus now on values A > A, for which r* > 0. The numerator of the 
second term is a quadratic polynomial in A whose maximal value is (1 - 
r*)2[1 + (1 - 3)*]2A2/4. Therefore, (dgldA).<* < 0 for A > A as long as 
(1 - 3) (1 - V() > [1 (1 - *] 
p8A42 4r* 
As A tends to infinity, 1 - T* 6 O/A and -V"(r*)l(p,A2) - 0-2, so the 
condition becomes 1 + 0 2 > (1 - /3/2)2/(1 - 3). This holds if and only if3 is 
below some critical value in (0,1); hence the first part of Claim 3. Con- 
versely, one can show from (A.19) that lim , o(dg/dA),=, = A2/l3im,o0 
(-A/r*) > 0. Indeed, as A -> 0 (or also as / 
-, 1) the growth rate (22) 
reduces to the complete markets case, where dg/dr < 0. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8 The asymptotic variance A2 = o2/[1 - 2(1 _- )2] 
associated to a constant tax rate r decreases on the domain (r, 1); note in 
particular that 3(1 - I) < 1. Let T(A) denote the inverse, decreasing 
function, which maps (ar2, (r2/[1 - P2(1 - )2]) into (., 1). A steady state is 
an intersection of this decreasing curve with the equilibrium tax function 
r*(A, A) defined by (26) or (A.5). When A - 0 this function is upward 
sloping, by Proposition 6; hence there can be at most one equilibrium. 
Moreover, r*((u2, A) < T*(o, A) = 1 T(o-2) and T*(or2/(1 - P2), A) > T*(0, A) 
= 0 = T(o(2/(1 - p/2)), so there is a unique steady state, with r, E (0, 1). 
Finally, a decrease in A shifts up the r*(A, A) function, which then cuts 
T(A) at a higher r and a lower A. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9 By Proposition 6, the equilibrium tax function 
l*(A, A) is now U-shaped in A: it decreases from T*(0, A) = 0 to a 
minimum at A = A, then rises towards T*(oo, A) = 1, cutting the r = 0 
axis at A = A. The fact that r*(A, A) now has a decreasing segment 
implies that it can intersect T(A) at several points. Here I shall only 
characterize the set of equilibria, rather than derive sufficient conditions 
for multiplicity (this is done in Benabou, 1995, for a closely related 
model). It is easy to see that such multiple intersections can only happen 
in the range A < A where r*(A, A) < 0, and that this scenario requires 
r2/(1 - /P2) < A. The number of intersections must then be odd, as r*(o 2/ 
(1 - /2), A) < 0 = T((2/(1 - /2)) and r*((2/[1 - p2(1 - r)2], A) > X = Tr(a2/ 
[1 - p2(1 - z)2]). Denote by {(Aj, Tj)}jn, these intersections, with AJ < A+ 
and 0 > Tj > Tji, and let W(rj, A1) be the corresponding levels of in- 
tertemporal efficiency. By Proposition 5, each W(-, A1) is strictly concave 
and maximized at some TP(A/) > 0. Since W(r, Aj) is decreasing in its 
second argument, this allows us to write 
W(rj+l, Ai+) < W(ij+l, Aj) < W(r, Aj); (A.20) 
hence the result that intertemporal efficiency declines as one moves to a 
more regressive steady state. The same holds afortiori for ex ante welfare, 
since the insurance motive makes it increasingly costly to reduce income 
sharing from Tj to r+1 as the variability of income rises from A to A/+l. A 
ranking similar to (A.20) obtains for growth rates as long as T = T*(A., A) < 
rg(6A); such is the case in particular if the AI's satisfy (A.4), ensuring that 
Tg(Aj) > 0. Since r < 0 for allj, implying A2 > r2/(1 - /2), it suffices that (2 > 
(1 + 0)(1 + p/)-1 
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Comment 
ROBERTO PEROTTI 
Columbia University 
Roland Benabou has written a very insightful and careful paper on a topic 
that has recently attracted considerable attention, both theoretically and 
empirically. The basic question the paper asks is: what can explain the 
observed negative reduced-form relationship between inequality and 
growth? One important contribution of the paper is to provide a unified 
and coherent analytical framework encompassing alternative theories of 
income distribution and growth. A second strength of the paper is its 
intellectual honesty: Benabou is not interested in selling any particular 
model or approach (or, if he is, it does not show), but only in clarifying 
theories and confronting them with the available empirical evidence. 
But the job of a discussant being what it is, I also have to voice some 
disagreement. My general point is that the paper does not say much on 
what, in my view, is becoming a more and more apparent feature of this 
literature: the growing gap between the virtually unlimited set of effects, 
results, nonlinearities, and complex interactions that we can model once 
we give up the representative-agent assumption, and what we will actu- 
ally be able to even think of testing with a reasonable degree of confi- 
dence. A second, less important point is that the picture the paper paints 
of the empirical evidence is, in my view, missing a potentially important 
mechanism whereby income distribution affects growth. 
Benabou starts from the explanation offered by politico-economic mod- 
els of income distribution and growth. The basic idea is simple: inequal- 
ity hurts growth because a poorer median voter faces a lower tax price of 
government expenditure; hence, in equilibrium expenditure and there- 
fore distortions are higher when the decisive voter is poorer. 
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Before addressing the empirical evidence on this approach, I want to 
point out the role of an important assumption of virtually all these mod- 
els, a role that is not always adequately highlighted: the homotheticity of 
the utility function. This implies that all individuals have the same sav- 
ing rate, given the return to investment they face. Because with perfect 
capital markets the equilibrium return is the same for all agents, it fol- 
lows that the distribution of income never changes; in particular, the 
decisive agent is always the same individual, and his income is always 
the same fraction of the average income. Hence, the tax rate is constant. 
This is the reason why the tax rate would be time-consistent in an 
infinite-horizon version of the model, as in Alesina and Rodrik (1994). In 
the absence of this assumption, when voting for a given tax rate, an 
individual should calculate the effects of that tax rate on the future 
distribution of income, hence on the future tax rates, and so on. This is a 
problem that, to my knowledge, has not been solved in closed form. 
Still, the basic message of these models is very clear, and quite inde- 
pendent of their technical details. In addition, this message has the 
advantage of being consistent with the reduced-form evidence. For it to 
be a candidate explanation for this evidence, however, one must find 
supporting empirical evidence on three components of these models. 
Benabou discusses two, and he correctly points out that they do not 
seem to be supported by the data. I want to argue that the reason might 
well be that the third component of these models, which has always 
been taken as granted, is also probably not supported by the data. 
The first component is the positive link between inequality and redis- 
tribution. It is true that redistribution can occur in many ways, as 
Benabou and others have argued. But it is also true that, of all the 
measurable ways that have been studied empirically, not one seems to be 
robustly and/or significantly positively correlated with inequality. It is 
also interesting to note that, in a survey of a dozen careful studies of the 
overall incidence of taxation and government expenditure, Lecaillon et 
al. (1984) found one persistent pattern: the higher the pre-fisc Gini coeffi- 
cient, the lower the percentage fall in the same coefficient that can be 
attributed to the redistributive effect of fiscal policy. 
The second component of these models is the negative link between 
growth and redistribution. Here too the evidence seems to point strongly 
in the opposite direction. This is more surprising, because it runs counter 
to any reasonable view of the economy: if taken literally, it just means that 
there is no dynamic equity-efficiency trade-off. Several models have been 
advanced in recent years to explain the positive relationship between 
redistribution and growth. Benabou himself correctly points out that in 
principle one can always think of a combination of redistribution and 
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subsidies that maintains growth at the rate the central planner would set. 
Yet, as positive models, these explanations are often far-fetched, and they 
are very difficult to test. For instance, when redistribution occurs through 
investment subsidies, growth and redistribution are positively linked: 
now it is poorer individuals who like growth-enhancing investment subsi- 
dies, while richer agents dislike them because they depress the value of 
existing capital. But I have yet to see a real-life entrepreneur who dislikes 
investment subsidies, or a real-life government that uses investment sub- 
sidies as a redistributive tool with any macroeconomic significance. In the 
end, I think that the simplest explanation is still the most plausible: re- 
verse causation. Faster-growing countries can afford to redistribute more, 
and redistribution is a luxury good. Of course, with good instruments we 
should be able to disentangle this effect. But a good instrument is one of 
those things that life dispenses very sparingly. 
The third component of the model that we need some evidence on is 
that fiscal policy more or less should redistribute from the rich to the 
poor, and in an approximately monotonic way. Benabou addresses this 
link only briefly in footnote 23, and in the context of a model with 
imperfect capital markets; however, I believe it could be the key to under- 
standing the empirical problems of many political-economy models of 
income distribution and growth. Redistribution through the overall fis- 
cal system is notoriously a very difficult thing to measure, because of the 
almost unsurmountable difficulties in estimating the incidence of a num- 
ber of tax and especially expenditure items. Nevertheless, two general 
conclusions seem to emerge from several studies on industrialized and 
developing countries (see e.g. Lecaillon et al., 1984; Van der Walle, 1995). 
First, the very rich tend to be net losers from the fiscal system, while the 
very poor are often, but not always, net gainers; in between, say from 
the third or even the second to the eighth decile, there is considerable 
variation across countries. But if redistribution occurs, it is usually very 
limited; and in developing countries, it is often toward the middle class. 
If one looks only at taxation, there is also ample evidence that in several 
developing countries the average tax rate is U-shaped as a function of 
income. Second, two types of government expenditure seem to be genu- 
inely redistributive: expenditure on primary education, and expenditure 
on health. 
On the other hand, expenditure on tertiary education is well known to 
be extremely regressive. This is important, because in many developing 
countries expenditure on tertiary education has the lion's share. One 
only needs to go through the IMF's Government Finance Statistics to see 
the enormous prevalence of expenditure on tertiary education in certain 
African countries. Given the relative enrollments in primary and tertiary 
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education, and the household income of students at the two levels, the 
numbers imply a tremendous redistribution to the rich. Furthermore, for 
certain countries in the sample some variables that we use to measure 
redistribution in reality redistribute income to the middle class (see e.g. 
Alesina, 1995, for a forceful discussion of this fact); for instance, in many 
Latin American countries social security has long been reserved for rela- 
tively few workers in the formal sector and for government employees 
(see e.g. Mesa-Lago, 1985). Thus, it should not come entirely as a sur- 
prise that the income distribution-redistribution link does not perform 
very well empirically, particularly in developing countries. 
A by-product of politico-economic models of income distribution and 
growth is a theory of the role of democratic institutions in the growth 
process. Benabou argues that a widespread interpretation of these 
models-that they should be more relevant for democracies-is not eas- 
ily defensible, for two basic reasons. First, it is essentially a statement on 
cross partial second derivatives, and as such difficult to test. Second, 
nondemocracies too are responsive to some constituency, so what mat- 
ters is what type of nondemocracy we are dealing with. I disagree with 
the first reason and agree, with some reservations on its empirical impli- 
cations, with the second. 
Interactive terms and split samples are there to test for cross-partial- 
second-derivative effects. Several studies have interacted an income dis- 
tribution variable with a democracy dummy variable in an otherwise 
standard growth regression. In most cases, the interactive term turns out 
to be insignificant. However, this approach forces all the other coeffi- 
cients, like those of school enrollment and GDP per capita, to be the 
same in democracies and nondemocracies, even if they are not. In par- 
ticular, in the pooled regression the coefficient of the school enrollment 
variables reflects heavily the coefficient in nondemocracies, which is 
much higher; because school enrollment and equality are positively cor- 
related, this results in an insignificant interactive term. In my paper 
(Perotti, 1996) I show that if the other coefficients are not constrained to 
be equal, i.e. if one runs two separate regressions for democracies and 
nondemocracies, income distribution is indeed significant in democra- 
cies, and insignificant in nondemocracies. 
Of course, the question then becomes: why should the coefficients of 
school enrollment be different in democracies and nondemocracies? It is 
hard to come up with reasons why they should. Yet, the answer might 
be very simple: the relevant difference is between rich and poor coun- 
tries, rather than democracies and nondemocracies. In the sample of 
countries for which we have income distribution data, there are very few 
democracies with income below $1500 in 1960, while the richest 25 coun- 
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tries are virtually all democracies. In fact, if one reruns the regressions 
splitting the sample into rich and poor countries, the results are virtually 
identical to those one obtains when the sample is split into democracies 
and nondemocracies: in poor countries, the coefficient of income distri- 
bution is insignificant, while in rich countries it is very significant. 
So we might be down to yet another question: why should income 
distribution be more strongly related to growth in rich countries than in 
poor countries? I offer two tentative explanations. First, higher measure- 
ment error on income distribution in poorer countries. This is also 
consistent with the fact that virtually any relationship involving income 
distribution is weaker in developing countries, as I will show later. 
Second, the often perverse redistributive properties of fiscal systems in 
poorer countries, which I discussed earlier. 
The practical implication of all this is very simple: the overlap between 
the existing datasets on income distribution and fiscal policy-combined 
with the scarcity of democratic regimes throughout the world-leaves 
very little hope of disentangling any meaningful relationship involving 
the notion of democracy and income distribution. This brings me to the 
second point that Benabou makes on the issue: what matters is not so 
much if a country is a nondemocracy, but the nature of the government. 
It is hard to disagree with this point, but I think Benabou is far too 
optimistic on its practical implications when he argues in Section 2.5 that 
"it should be feasible in future work to provide more discriminating tests 
by distinguishing between left- and right-wing nondemocracies, at least 
for some subset of countries." 
I doubt that this can actually be implemented. Under the most liberal 
selection criteria we have cross-sectional data on income distribution for 
about 70 countries. Of these 70 countries, we have data on fiscal variables 
over the 1970-1990 period for about 55 countries. Of these 55 countries, at 
most 25 or 30 are going to be nondemocracies, under any given definition 
of democracy. By the time we have classified these governments into left- 
wing, right-wing, center, and "don't know," we are left with desperately 
few observations to test any theory. Second, how do we classify non- 
democracies? In many cases, it will be more or less explicitly through their 
actions: a left-wing democracy is, in part, defined by its treatment (at least 
in economic terms) of low-income individuals. If instead we try to charac- 
terize a nondemocracy using some a priori criterion, we very soon run into 
big problems: for instance, how do we classify the first Peron govern- 
ment, and many other populist governments? 
The second class of theories Benabou discusses is based on imperfect 
credit markets. Here too the basic idea is at the same time simple and 
powerful: when credit markets are imperfect, the distribution of wealth 
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determines how much an individual invests in physical and/or human 
capital and what the return to investment is. Benabou's rendition of these 
idea in this paper has two crucial ingredients: first, logarithmic utilities, 
which implies that the savings rate is independent of the individual's rate 
of return to investment; second, diminishing returns to an individual's 
investment. The two ingredients combined imply that richer individuals 
save more, in absolute amounts; hence, in more unequal societies more 
investment is done by individuals with lower return to investment.1 
As Benabou points out, conceptually this approach has one key differ- 
ence with the political-economy approach: although for a given total 
aggregate income the total savings and investment in the economy is the 
same as with perfect credit markets, now the "average" return to invest- 
ment and therefore the second-period aggregate income is a function of 
the distribution of disposable income and therefore investment. In turn, 
the second-period aggregate income has a positive externality on each 
individual's income. In a positive model, this means that in general a 
voter will not internalize the effects of redistribution on the distribution 
of investment and therefore on the aggregate rate of growth of the 
economy. Hence, now some redistribution is good for growth, because it 
redistributes resources to agents with higher return; but a lot of redistri- 
bution is bad for growth, because of the usual disincentive effects of 
taxation. The relationship between growth and inequality is no longer 
monotonic. 
Also, now it is not necessarily true that a richer decisive voter (as in a 
right-wing dictatorship) is necessarily good for growth. In particular, 
Proposition 7 has an interesting insight: an increase in inequality now 
can increase growth if the decisive voter is richer than the median and if 
inequality is not too high. The intuition is the following: because of the 
definition of wealth bias that Benabou adopts, with positive wealth bias 
an increase in inequality is necessarily associated with a richer decisive 
voter, and therefore a lower tax rate. If inequality is not too high, this is 
good for growth because the growth-reducing disincentive effect of tax 
rates prevails over the growth-enhancing effect of redistribution. This is 
also the intuition for why what matters is the correlation between politi- 
cal power and economic wealth. 
These, I believe, are interesting insights. I still have two comments. 
The first is on the theory: the relationship between political power and 
1. It is worthwhile noting that in models of human capital investment and fertility, the 
standard assumption is that individuals in dynasties with higher human capital have a 
higher return to human capital investment, for any given amount invested. However, 
they still face diminishing returns to investment; since they save more in Benabou's 
model, in equilibrium one might still obtain Benabou's result. 
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economic power in Propositions 6 and 7 seems to me fairly specific to 
the definition of wealth bias adopted by Benabou. Suppose that, given 
the average income, wealth bias is defined by the ratio of the income 
of the decisive voter to the average, rather than by the percentile he 
belongs to. This is a perfectly legitimate definition of wealth bias (recall 
that the average income is kept constant), which might apply to dictator- 
ships just as well as the definition used by Benabou. Then an increase 
in dispersion, like a mean-preserving spread, would always lead to less 
growth, because the equilibrium tax rate remains the same but the 
"average" return to investment decreases. More generally, Propositions 
6 and 7 illustrate a general feature of many models in this literature: 
when one relaxes the representative-agent assumption, endogenizes 
fiscal policy, and lets it interact with imperfect credit markets, there is 
virtually no limit to the results and nonlinearities one can get. In Propo- 
sitions 6 and 7, there are a remarkable number of cases, with often 
opposite implications, depending on the degree of wealth bias, on the 
degree of inequality, on the parameter of the production function, and 
other variables. 
This leads me to the second comment, which is empirical. When we try 
to take these models and these insights to the data, once again we 
quickly realize how many effects we have modeled and how little we will 
be able to test them, at least with the macro-level data that we use in 
growth regressions. To start from the most basic component, for non- 
OECD countries and even for some OECD countries we essentially do 
not have reliable proxies for the degree of credit-market imperfections. 
An indirect piece of evidence is that primary- and especially, secondary- 
school enrollment ratios are strongly positively related to equality, after 
controlling for GDP per capita and the other usual suspects (see Perotti, 
1996). The fact that the relationship is much stronger for secondary- 
school enrollment, which has higher direct and opportunity costs, than 
for primary-school enrollment seems to indicate that credit-market imper- 
fections might play a role. One potential problem, however, is that this 
relationship is also much stronger in richer countries, while we probably 
expect credit-market imperfections to be a more important constraint on 
investment in human capital in poor countries. But yet again, higher 
measurement error in poorer countries is consistent with this finding. 
The third class of models Benabou studies is based, roughly speaking, 
on the notion that inequality fosters some form of social or political insta- 
bility, or both. This type of idea can only be formalized in fairly specific 
and seemingly ad hoc models, and it is very difficult to test, for the obvi- 
ous reason that the concept of sociopolitical instability is rather nebulous 
and does not have an immediately obvious and objective counterpart. 
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As Benabou points out, existing models fail to capture the role of un- 
certainty, and do not have room for phenomena like riots, coups, and 
assassinations. However, both uncertainty and these phenomena figure 
prominently in the existing empirical studies of this link. I am much less 
disturbed by this than Benabou is. The notion that inequality-especially 
extreme inequality-in the long run generates some type of sociopolitical 
instability, which in turn hurts investment and growth, seems to me very 
plausible. Empirically, I believe this explanation performs much better 
than the two others that we have seen so far. Measures of sociopolitical 
instability based on indicators like coups, political assassinations, violent 
protests, etc., are significantly positively correlated with inequality and 
negatively correlated with investment and growth. Moreover, these rela- 
tionships tend to be quite robust. That existing models do not have a role 
for riots and assassinations is not surprising to me, and I doubt that any 
model ever will. Slightly more disturbing is the inability to distinguish 
between uncertainty effects and level effects on the return to investment. 
But again, I doubt that we will ever be able to disentangle the two effects, 
and I am not sure I would worry too much. Furthermore, I am not even 
sure that I would always want to think in terms of return to investment: 
after all, when people are busy killing each other it is pretty hard to grab 
investment opportunities, however high their rates of return might be. I 
do, however, have a suggestion regarding an area where some progress 
is, I believe, feasible: specifically, it might be interesting to go deeper into 
existing measures of instability, by distinguishing manifestations of social 
instability and social stress, like violent protests, from manifestations of 
political instability; and within the latter, executive instability from legisla- 
tive instability. 
I would like to conclude by discussing an empirical relationship that 
Benabou mentions only briefly in the conclusions: the relationship be- 
tween income distribution on one side and fertility and demographics on 
the other. This is not intended to be a criticism of the author, because 
Benabou intentionally focuses on those ideas for which we have a 
theory, and admittedly, we have very few models on the subject of 
income distribution, fertility, and growth.2 Yet, I think it is important to 
mention it because it is statistically so strong and eminently reasonable. 
If one regresses growth on fertility and the latter on an index of in- 
equality, the former coefficient is negative, and the latter is positive. Both 
are large in absolute value and highly significant (see Perotti, 1996). The 
latter coefficient remains large and significant even after controlling for 
proxies for cultural factors like regional dummies, for feedback from 
2. The papers I am aware of are Galor and Zang (1993) and Dahan (1995). 
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growth, and for virtually any determinant of fertility one can think of. 
These estimates are perfectly consistent with a reasonable extension of a 
standard representative-agent model of human capital, fertility, and in- 
vestment to an environment with human capital dispersion. Richer peo- 
ple have lower fertility and higher investment in human capital because 
they have a higher return to human-capital investment and a higher 
opportunity cost of rearing children. Hence, with reasonable elasticities, 
it is fairly straightforward that a redistribution of human capital to the 
poor should decrease fertility and increase investment in human capital. 
Note that this mechanism is consistent not only with the evidence on 
inequality and fertility, but also with the evidence on inequality and 
school enrollment ratios briefly discussed above. 
Thus, in the end, the link between fertility, human-capital investment, 
and inequality might be one of the most promising areas of research in 
our search for an explanation of the inequality-growth nexus. 
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Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis* 
1. Introduction 
Benabou has written a very interesting paper about the connection be- 
tween inequality and growth. He draws his conclusions from a review of 
*The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve system. 
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the literature and an analysis of the data. In his review of the literature, 
he sorts previous work into two main groups: one group that includes 
models with perfect credit markets and another that includes models 
with imperfect credit markets. In his analysis of the data, he concludes 
that the data support a negative relation between inequality and growth. 
The first strain of literature reviewed by Benabou uses models that 
assume perfect credit markets. Here the mechanism linking inequality 
and growth is the endogenous selection of economic policies by voters. 
Benabou argues against these models because the predicted link between 
inequality and growth through redistribution is absent in the data. This 
leads Benabou to argue in favor of models in which credit markets are 
imperfect-in fact, agents cannot borrow at all-and redistribution to- 
wards the poor helps achieve a more efficient outcome. Benabou illus- 
trates these two strains of the literature by means of a very ingenious and 
simple model that encompasses the cases with perfect and imperfect 
credit markets. As a bonus, in this paper Benabou does two more things: 
he analyzes the time-series data on inequality across countries in search of 
some evidence (or lack of it) for convergence of inequality, and he reviews 
a third strain of the literature on social conflict, inequality, and growth. In 
this last approach, various groups engage in either conflict (extraction of 
resources at the expense of other groups) or cooperation (which leads to 
growth). This strain represents an implementation of the idea that in- 
stances that can be characterized by "repeated prisoner's-dilemma situa- 
tions" are central in the formalization of social interaction. 
In my discussion, I will concentrate on the following issues: Benabou's 
argumentation against political-economy models with perfect credit mar- 
kets; his discussion of models where redistribution towards the poor 
increases efficiency by overcoming borrowing constraints; a small varia- 
tion on the type of model proposed by Benabou in models without credit 
markets that can lead to diverging conclusions; and the problems of the 
type of simple models that Benabou considers. Finally, I will make a 
couple of comments on the last two topics discussed in this paper: the 
analysis of time-series data and the review of the literature that ad- 
dresses the issue of conflict versus cooperation. 
2. Political-Economy Models with Perfect Credit Markets 
The first strain of the literature Benabou discusses, starting with Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994), includes a collection of 
models in which agents differ in wealth, the median agent has wealth 
below the mean, and the political system is used to redistribute wealth 
from the rich to the poor. In these models, taxation, which basically 
84- RIOS-RULL 
amounts to theft, discourages investment and hence reduces growth. 
These models make assumptions sufficient to guarantee that the median- 
wealth agent is, in fact, the politically decisive voter. 
Benabou constructs a simple model with a closed-form solution that 
captures some of the main qualitative features of these models: the more 
inequality, the more redistribution, the less growth. The model is of a 
two-period overlapping-generations economy with log utility. There is 
an initial endowment when young, wi, that differs across agents, but no 
endowment when old. There are perfect credit markets. There is an 
individual investment technology with decreasing returns to scale, 
which yields output in the second period given by 
Yi = r k w1 -', 
where w is the aggregate endowment. 
The existence of perfect credit markets allows individual investment to 
differ from individual savings. With linear budget constraints, savings in 
this model would be independent of the after-tax rate of return; how- 
ever, there is a nonlinear tax schedule that makes first-period consump- 
tion (and hence savings) depend on the effective rate of return. The tax 
schedule gives after-tax output from the production technology by 
Yi = yiT 
where r is a parameter that controls the size of taxes (in this model 
interest income is not taxed). 
The tax system affects households not through redistribution (in equi- 
librium all agents pay the same taxes), but through the manipulation of 
the interest rate: borrowers want to lower it. The individual investment 
function depends only on the tax rate (negatively) and on the aggregate 
endowment (positively) and is given by 
ki = s(r)w, 
where s(r) is a decreasing function of r. 
Individual savings depend on the individual endowment. The differ- 
ence between investment and savings is borrowing: 
bi = wi - ci - ki. 
In this model, voters do not have to worry about the effects of their 
policy choice on future policies, since nothing that can be done by youn- 
ger generations affects them. 
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In a political system where the median voter chooses policy, more 
inequality leads to less growth, more redistribution, and less efficiency. 
If the political system is not a democracy (i.e., is biased in favor of or 
against wealth), then the more biased the system is against the poor, the 
higher the growth. Efficiency is maximized when the key household 
looks like the average household. Empirically, then, what matters is not 
just the absolute size of the deviation from democracy, but its direction. 
Thus Benabou makes the important observation that studies that try to 
find a relation between absence of democracy and growth are likely to 
miss the point. 
A key property of Benabou's model is that the size of the distortions 
generated in the model do not show up in the amount of redistribution. 
Note that the redistributive schemes do not result in high volumes of 
transfers; in fact, they generate no transfers whatsoever. Redistribution 
works through the manipulation of the key relative price, the rate at 
which borrowing and lending is done. 
Benabou seems to be dissatisfied with this class of models as a means 
of connecting inequality and growth. This arises from the following 
observations on the data: (1) there seems to be a negative relation 
between inequality and growth; (2) there is no clear relation between 
redistribution and inequality; and (3) there is a positive relation be- 
tween redistribution and output per capita (perhaps also between redis- 
tribution and growth). Benabou points to this lack of evidence for an 
association between redistribution and output per capita (or growth) as 
an indication that these models are missing the mark. 
I do not think that models of the link between inequality and growth 
with perfect credit markets can be dismissed solely on the grounds that 
there is no empirical relation between redistribution and output per capita 
(or growth). The reason is that, as Benabou's own model exemplifies, the 
fight over the pie does not necessarily lead to higher transfers, just to 
higher distortions. There is some work (Coate and Morris, 1995; Holmes 
and Schmitz, 1995; Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996; Prescott, 1996) that points 
to the selection of barriers to technology or to inefficient policies as out- 
comes of the political process. This implies that unequal societies might 
choose policies that are detrimental to growth in complete-market set- 
tings without exhibiting a high volume of transfers. 
Another reason I do not think that the evidence against complete- 
market models is very compelling is the reliance on cross-sectional data. 
Krusell and Rios-Rull (1994) show that a key quantitative determinant 
for the amount of redistribution is the constitution of the country, espe- 
cially the frequency of policy reassessment. In that model, inequality 
drives growth via the inefficient transfer mechanism, but a cross section 
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of country data from this model would give the impression, as do the 
real-world data, that this mechanism is not operative; the reason is that 
the differences in constitutions would be much more quantitatively im- 
portant for transfers and growth than differences in initial inequality. In 
addition, recall that other cross-country differences can also be impor- 
tant (Benabou points to the bias towards the key political agent, which 
he denotes by A, as a key factor.). 
An important property of Benabou's model is that agents do not have 
to worry about the future consequences of their actions. This implies 
that extensions of this model that use shorter periods or in which there 
are more interactions between generations have to depart drastically 
from the type of approach with closed-form solutions that Benabou uses, 
because of serious technical problems that arise when agents are truly 
forward-looking. The literature that Benabou reviews has taken various 
routes to avoid this problem: for example, it has limited model dynamics 
to make future actions and policies irrelevant to current voters; however, 
this also limits the issues that can be addressed and leaves the two- 
period overlapping-generations model with irrelevant young agents as 
the only usable model [Persson and Tabellini (1994) and also the model 
constructed by Benabou, have this property]. Another approach treats 
the political decision as a problem of determining in the initial period a 
policy that will remain constant forever (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994); this 
contradicts one of the features inherent in governments, the inability to 
commit to future policies. On some occasions, the literature has opted to 
limit the rationality available to agents, so that they are not fully aware of 
the effects of these policies. Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1996) de- 
scribe how these various approaches compare quantitatively with one 
that is fully dynamic and in which agents are completely rational. 
Models of the type used by Benabou, two-period overlapping-gener- 
ations models with limited interaction between generations, are not very 
good for making quantitative predictions. In particular, this structure 
does not seem to be very appropriate for studying issues of capital accumu- 
lation, especially in the light of Kotlikoff and Summers' (1981) findings 
that the bulk of the wealth in the United States is related to bequests. It 
seems to me that infinite-lived-agent models are more appropriate. 
3. Models with Imperfect Credit Markets 
The second strain of the literature Benabou discusses includes models 
with imperfect or nonexistent credit markets. In this setting, without 
transfers, the allocation is inefficient, as poor agents invest less than 
what they would if there were perfect credit markets. Redistributive 
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schemes now allow poor agents to overcome this friction and hence can 
foster growth. 
Benabou has a nice, simple implementation of these ideas that needs 
no basic changes in the setup of the model used for the case of perfect 
credit markets. Whereas the previous model has an investment function 
that depends only on aggregate assets, without credit markets the indi- 
vidual investment function is proportional not to aggregate assets, but to 
the individual's own assets, with the same constant of proportionality. 
Given decreasing returns to scale to individual investments, this feature 
yields inefficiency. In this model, individual savings equal individual 
investment and are given by 
ki = S(T)W,. 
In this model, inequality reduces growth, and there is actual redistribu- 
tion. Note also that efficiency requires a positive tax rate. When a politi- 
cal economy mechanism is used to endogenize policy selection, we learn 
that the agent with median wealth prefers a higher tax rate than the 
efficient one and that the progressivity of the tax system leads the pre- 
ferred tax rate of the mean wealth holder to depend on the variance. 
Benabou argues that this is a very promising type of model based on 
two pieces of evidence: that market imperfections affect growth and 
investment negatively, and that public education has a positive effect 
on growth. However, if it is market incompleteness that accounts for 
the comovements of growth and redistribution in the data, we should 
expect to see that transfers are tied to investment projects. It seems to 
me that the majority of transfers in developed countries are mainly 
designed to enhance the consumption possibilities of the recipients 
(social security, welfare) or to protect prices of certain goods (mostly in 
agriculture), and not to finance investment projects. Moreover, one of 
the components of government outlays that probably does assist indi- 
vidual investment is public education, which is not typically labelled a 
transfer. 
4. Variant of Benabou's Model Where the Specific Type of 
Redistribution Used Matters 
A key property of transfers in Benabou's model that yield higher growth 
is that appropriate recipients, which in his case are the poorest people, 
are chosen. To illustrate that this is not general, consider a variation of 
Benabou's model in which the quality of the project varies across indi- 
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viduals. This can be easily formalized through an individual investment 
technology given by 
Yi =rikfw -. 
Note that this technology is identical to Benabou's except that now the 
coefficient multiplying the return is ri, individual-specific, rather than 
the common term r used in his model. 
In a model with perfect credit markets, the individual level of invest- 
ment is now an increasing function of ri, while the individually desired 
tax rate is a function of both ri and wi. (For a given project quality ri, the 
higher wi is, the lower are the desired taxes as indexed by r; for a given 
level of wealth wi, individuals might want a higher or lower tax rate 
depending on their ri, since some might be lenders and some might be 
borrowers.) In this model, redistribution plays no role in improving 
efficiency. Moreover, taxation generates positive amounts of redistribu- 
tion because projects come in different sizes. Here, the joint distribution 
of wi and ri will determine the mapping from inequality to economic 
performance and to volumes of redistribution, and it is not clear that 
more inequality would lead to more redistribution and to less growth. 
This mapping depends on the joint distribution of both variables. 
In a world with imperfect credit markets, the special nature of the 
example used (two-period model with log utility and no second-period 
endowments) makes the individual investment rule the same as in 
Benabou: i.e., a function that is independent of ri. We also get an ineffi- 
cient allocation without transfers. However, here efficiency can only be 
achieved if the transfers depend not only on wealth w, but also on the 
quality of the project, ri. Depending on the joint distribution of ri and wi, 
transfers from the rich to the poor might increase or decrease the effi- 
ciency of the system. In fact, if we think of models in this vein in which 
periods are shorter than one generation, and hence where there might 
be persistence over time of the quality of the projects, it might very well 
be the case that subsidizing the previously successful entrepreneurs, the 
rich, is the policy that maximizes growth. 
5. Problems with Simple Models 
Whether, in the context of the model just outlined, the specific joint 
distribution of ri and wi is such that efficiency is increased with transfers 
from the rich to the poor or with transfers from the poor to the rich can 
only be resolved empirically. Here is where simple models with closed- 
form solutions and intuitive appeal start losing their usefulness, as they 
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are not capable of making tight quantitative predictions about issues 
such as the sources of inequality and how it persists over time. To give 
an idea of why models like the one presented are not so good for quanti- 
tative purposes, note that in these models there is no clear distinction 
between income and wealth. There is one variable (an endowment) that 
plays the role of both. 
Tight quantitative predictions require a theory that simultaneously 
accounts for the joint distribution of income and wealth and for the 
intertemporal mobility of households. There is some quantitative work, 
based on general equilibrium models, that is starting to give us leads 
about the key determinants of inequality and its intertemporal transmis- 
sion (Aiyagari, 1994; Huggett, 1995; Krusell and Smith, 1995; Castaneda, 
Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull, 1995; Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and 
Joines, 1994). Among their findings is that the absence of insurance 
markets for idiosyncratic uncertainty by itself, even when capable of 
accounting for the concentration of income seen in the data, cannot 
account for the observed concentration of wealth. This suggests some 
kind of increasing returns to individual asset accumulation. (In terms of 
the model just outlined, this can be modeled, for example, as relatively 
persistent disparities in the ri.) Moreover, Quadrini (1996) seems to do a 
much better job in simultaneously accounting for the key features of the 
joint distribution of income and wealth by explicitly including entrepre- 
neurial choice in a model of this type. 
These findings indicate that even though it seems that imperfect credit 
markets are important in shaping the distribution of income and wealth, 
the implication for growth policy is not necessarily to subsidize the poor 
indiscriminately, but rather to engage in some form of encouragement of 
entrepreneurship. 
6. Other Issues 
In addition to reviewing the two main strains of the literature, Benabou 
also tries to assess empirically whether the degree of inequality across 
countries is converging. The lack of sharp findings shows that it is still 
too early to make a call on this issue. 
Finally, Benabou reviews models where the relations between differ- 
ent social groups are modeled as either conflict or cooperation. These 
models are basically of the repeated-prisoner's-dilemma type. I agree 
with Benabou that these models do not have a clear link to social con- 
flicts unless issues of private information lead to periods of punishment 
(as for example in Zarazaga (1993), where groups fight over slices of the 
budget). Another interesting implementation of these ideas is Chang 
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(1995), in which workers and capitalists engage in centralized bargaining 
to set wages. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, Benabou has looked at an important group of papers that 
study the relation between inequality and growth, as well as the cross- 
sectional evidence regarding this relation. Still there are some pertinent 
issues that Benabou does not consider. All the evidence used comes 
from cross-sectional studies; there is no attempt to use, for example, 
U.S. time-series data. The United States has had large changes in its 
wealth concentration since the 1920s, with associated large changes in 
productivity growth. 
Also, the types of models reviewed and used by Benabou are chosen 
less for quantitative analysis than for analytical tractability. For example, 
the models used have the feature that one period means one generation, 
i.e., at least thirty years, and thus income and wealth are the same vari- 
able. Because of their lack of tight quantitative predictions, these models 
are not going to be very useful in helping us understand the mechanisms 
that determine inequality. In this respect, I think that the recent literature 
that attempts to make quantitative statements about the determinants of 
inequality (not reviewed by Benabou) may ultimately be more useful for 
understanding the relationship between inequality and growth. 
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Discussion 
Per Krusell asked for a clarification about the empirical work: Was the 
author testing whether all countries converge to the same income distri- 
bution, or whether each country converges to a different distribution 
that depends on its characteristics and initial conditions? Benabou ac- 
knowledged that the prediction depends on the model and the parame- 
ters; in particular, for some models and parameter configurations one 
can get multiple long-run distributions and countries converging to dif- 
ferent distributions. His own test addresses only the issue of whether 
there is some tendency for Gini coefficients in different countries to 
become less dispersed over time. 
Bob Barsky noted that in many dynastic models the asymptotic results 
are sensitive to parameter values, and that under certain conditions 
there may exist only degenerate limiting distributions. One simple exam- 
ple is when one agent has a low discount rate and thus gets all the 
wealth asymptotically. Another possible example is when parents invest 
more in their more able children. We don't observe these extreme distri- 
butions in reality, Barsky suggested, because governments typically inter- 
vene when inequality becomes too great. 
Daron Acemoglu pointed out that the paper does not deal explicitly 
with labor-market dynamics, which may be an important omission. In 
particular, we have observed significant increases in wage inequality in 
OECD countries in recent years, which is likely to have a different set of 
causes than increased inequality in nonlabor income. Michael Klein ex- 
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pressed interest in what the paper has to say about the mobility of 
individuals between income groups. He suggested that empirical analy- 
sis of mobility might help differentiate among models of inequality. 
Julio Rotemberg asked for a tighter connection of the analysis with the 
case of the East Asian "dragons." He agreed that, assuming the existence 
of credit constraints, the greater initial equality of incomes in East Asia 
could help to explain the rapid human-capital accumulation observed in 
those countries. But the idea that credit constraints affected physical in- 
vestment didn't ring so true; in countries like Korea and Japan, much 
investment was by large companies with government support and sub- 
stantial resources, not by individuals. He wondered whether the most 
benign effect of equality in East Asia might have been the enhancement of 
cooperation and social cohesion. 
Benabou, in his response, took issue with Roberto Perotti's contention 
that the models were becoming too complex and nonlinear to admit of 
useful empirical application. He suggested that one interesting direction 
would be to test for the existence of multiple equilibria. Another useful 
exercise, using the models as a guide, would be to try to separate out the 
effects of inequality on growth that are mediated by endogenous policy 
from those effects that operate through nonpolicy channels. 
